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ABSTRACT
The demand for air quality depends on health impacts and defensive investments, but little
research assesses the empirical importance of defenses. A rich quasi-experiment suggests that the
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Budget Program (NBP), a cap-and-trade market, decreased NOx
emissions, ambient ozone concentrations, pharmaceutical expenditures, and mortality rates. The
annual reductions in pharmaceutical purchases, a key defensive investment, and mortality are
valued at about $800 million and $1.1 billion, respectively, suggesting that defenses are over
one-third of willingness-to-pay for reductions in NOx emissions. Further, estimates indicate that
the NBP’s benefits easily exceed its costs and that NOx reductions have substantial benefits.
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I. Introduction
Willingness to pay (WTP) for wellbeing frequently depends on factors that enter the utility
function directly (e.g., the probability of mortality, school quality, local crime rates, etc.) and
compensatory investments that help to determine these factors (Grossman 1972). In a wide
variety of contexts, the empirical literature has almost exclusively focused on the direct effects
(e.g., health outcomes) of these factors and left the defensive investments largely unmeasured.
As examples, there has been little effort to measure: the use of medications or air filters to
protect against poor air quality (e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2003; Currie and Neidell 2005);
parental expenditures on supplemental tutoring to improve educational outcomes for their
children; or the costs of alarm systems and additional security to protect against crime. All of
these defensive investments are costly and displace consumption of utility-generating goods.
Indeed, economic theory suggests that these actions constitute a significant portion of the costs
of harms, as individuals should set the marginal utility of their purchase equal to the marginal
utility of avoiding the harm itself. It therefore seems reasonable to presume that the available
estimates of willingness to pay for a wide variety of factors are substantially understated.
This paper develops a measure of willingness to pay for air quality improvements that
accounts for both the direct health impacts and defensive investments. As a measure of defensive
behavior, we investigate whether medication usage responds to changes in air quality. This is
likely to be an especially important measure of defensive expenditures, because, for example, the
annual cost of prescription medications for asthma is reported to exceed the monetized value of
any other component of asthma’s social cost, including mortality, emergency department
admissions, or lost productivity (Weiss and Sullivan 2001). We also provide new evidence on
how air pollution affects more commonly studied outcomes like mortality and hospitalizations.
The empirical application is based on a quasi-experiment that exploits three sources of
variation in the introduction of an emissions market for nitrogen oxides (NOx). The NOx Budget
Trading Program (NBP) operated a cap-and-trade system for over 2,500 electricity generating
units and industrial boilers in the Eastern and Midwestern U.S. between 2003 and 2008. Because
1
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this market had the goal of decreasing ozone pollution, which reaches high levels in summer, the
market operated only between May 1 and September 30. Specifically, we use a triple-difference
estimator that compares pollution, defensive expenditures and health outcomes in the NBP
participating and non-participating states, before versus after 2003, and summer versus winter.2
The empirical analysis produces several key results. First, there was a substantial decline
in air pollution emissions and ambient concentrations. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic effect of
this market on NOx emissions in the states participating in the NBP.3 In 2001-2002, daily NOx
emissions were fairly flat throughout the calendar year, with a peak in summer. In 2005-2007,
NOx emissions were nearly 40% lower but almost entirely during the summer months when the
NBP was in force. NOx emissions are a primary ingredient in the complex function that produces
ozone air pollution, so it is unsurprising that we find that the large reductions in NOx led to
declines in mean ozone concentrations of roughly 6% and reduced the number of summer days
with high ozone levels (i.e., more than 65 ppb) by about 35%, or a third of a standard deviation.
Second, these improvements in air quality produced substantial benefits. Medication
expenditures decreased by about 1.5% or roughly $800 million annually in the 19 Eastern and
Midwestern United States where the NBP was in force; this is close to an upper bound estimate
of the NBP’s total abatement costs. This decline in medication expenditures is evident both
among short-acting respiratory medications taken in response to the presentation of respiratory
symptoms and long-term control medications that are taken to prevent these episodes. Since
people can engage in other defensive investments like avoiding time outdoors or purchasing air
filters, medication expenditures provide a lower bound on the total defensive costs associated
with air pollution. Further, the summertime mortality rate declined by up to 0.5%, corresponding
to 2,200 fewer premature deaths per summer in the NBP states, mainly among individuals 75 and
older. The application of age-adjusted estimates of the value of a statistical life (Murphy and
Topel 2006) implies this reduced mortality is valued at about $1,100 million annually. The
2

“Winter” in this paper refers to the combined months of January-April and October-December.
Unless otherwise noted, our data on NOx emissions refer to emissions from power plants covered by our data (i.e.,
in the Acid Rain program).

3

2

mortality estimates are less precise than the medication ones, and the results must be interpreted
accordingly. Additionally, there is little systematic evidence of an effect of the NBP on
hospitalization charges. Overall, it is striking that defensive investments account for more than
one-third of our estimate of total willingness-to-pay for reductions in NOx emissions.4
Third, the paper provides the first instrumental variables estimates of the effect of NOx
emissions on health and defensive investments. Such information is an essential determinant of
air quality policy since NOx is a pollutant that can be controlled directly by regulation, whereas
ozone cannot be. Ambient ozone is determined by a complex function based on several factors
including NOx emissions, volatile organic compound emissions, and temperature. These
estimates suggest a significant causal link between NOx emissions, medication purchases, and
mortality. For example, we find that a 10 percentage point (pp) reduction in NOx emissions leads
to 0.06 pp reduction in medication purchases and also a 0.07 pp reduction in mortality. Further, it
may be appropriate to conclude the reductions in ozone concentrations stemming from the
reductions in NOx emissions are the primary channel for these health improvements; we
cautiously report instrumental variable estimates that reveal positive relationships between
ambient ozone concentrations and medication expenditures and mortality rates, respectively.
In addition to providing new evidence on the empirical importance of defensive
expenditures in the context of air pollution, this paper makes several contributions.5 First, the
results may be useful for the ongoing and contentious academic and policy debates about the
regulation of NOx emissions as a means to reduce ambient ozone concentrations. The recent
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NOx emissions can influence crop yields (through ozone), visibility, the value of outdoor activities, the purchase of
air filters, and other factors. A complete measure of willingness to pay for reductions in NOx emissions, as well as
the defensive expenditures’ (e.g., air filter purchases) share, would include all of these factors.
5
An emerging empirical literature aims to measure behavioral responses, including defenses, to health-reducing
environmental factors (Graff-Zivin and Neidell 2009; Neidell 2009; Deschênes and Greenstone 2011; Graff-Zivin,
Neidell, and Schlenker 2011; Barreca et al. 2016; Ito and Zhang 2016). An older theoretical literature analyzes
defenses and willingness to pay (Courant and Porter 1981; Bartik 1988). A small epidemiological literature, largely
using samples of under 100 asthma patients, shows that asthmatics increase medication use on polluted days
(Menichini and Mudu 2010). As we discuss later, our focus on summer versus rest-of-year seasonal expenditures
improves over existing work, which focuses on same-day effects. Same-day regressions can suffer from short-term
displacement if pollution merely shifts the day on which a person uses medication but does not change total
medium-run medication use. At the same time, we note that medications may be stored across seasons.
3

controversy surrounding Volkswagen’s use of a “defeat device” that understated NOx emissions
and ongoing litigation about the health consequences reflects the dearth of reliable information
on the health consequences of NOx emissions. More broadly, ozone is one of the six “criteria”
pollutants that the Clean Air Act targets, but unlike the other pollutants it has remained
persistently high. Further, the Obama Administration tightened the national ambient air quality
standard in 2015 from 75 to 70 ppb, following a long political and legal battle between the White
House, EPA, Congress, and industry; as of 2015, 126 million Americans or about 40% of the
population live in areas that violate this new air quality standard for ozone. These ozone
standards are contentious at least partly because much of the previous evidence comes from
observational studies where there is a substantial risk of confounding air pollution and other
determinants of health.6 The central role of NOx emissions in controlling ozone concentrations is
underscored by the fact that the regulatory impact analysis for the new ozone standard requires a
65% reduction in NOx emissions between 2011 and 2025 (USEPA 2015). The paper speaks
directly to this debate and can contribute to the regular updating of cost-benefit analyses of the
Clean Air Act.7
Second, this study is an important step forward in moving closer to the ideal of credibly
measuring the consequences of sustained exposure to air pollution. Much of the literature
relating human health and ozone concentrations focuses on daily or weekly variation in ozone
and on specific states or groups of cities; studies based on daily and/or weekly variation are
especially subject to concerns about “harvesting” or temporal displacement of mortality (and
medication expenditures) and that the true loss of life expectancy is small (Deschenes and
6

Key papers about the relationship between health and ozone include Bell et al. (2004), Currie and Neidell (2005),
NRC (2008), Jerrett et al. (2009), Neidell (2009), Lleras-Muney (2010), Moretti and Neidell (2011), and Dominici
et. al (2014).
7
The results are also important because they fill a knowledge gap in recent research on the NBP regulation.
Economic research has found that the NBP led firms to install costly abatement technologies, and that regulated
electricity generating units were especially likely to install highly effective “Selective Catalytic Reduction”
abatement technology (Fowlie 2010). Engineering estimates suggest that the marginal abatement cost of NOx
through this program is much larger than the marginal abatement cost of NOx from vehicles (Fowlie, Knittel, and
Wolfram 2012). An integrated assessment model simulating costs and benefits of this market finds that the NBP as
actually implemented was more cost-effective than an alternative design which recognized that damages vary across
space because actual abatement costs exceeded ex ante expectations (Fowlie and Muller 2013).
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Greenstone 2011). In contrast, the NBP provides quasi-experimental variation in emitted and
ambient air pollution at the 5-month level (i.e., May 1st through September 30th); in the case of
ozone, this is effectively annual variation because ozone is only considered a health risk during
the higher concentration summer months. For these reasons, the paper is less subject to concerns
about harvesting and is well suited to shed light on efforts to control NOx emissions and ozone
concentrations. Additionally, recent research has emphasized the importance of using quasiexperimental variation to obtain reliable estimates of the relationship between human wellbeing
and air pollution, and the NBP provides variation that is plausibly unrelated to other
determinants of wellbeing (Dominici, Greenstone, and Sunstein 2014).
Third, we are unaware of other studies that demonstrate the impact of an emissions
market on ambient pollution and human health with real world data. Most evaluations of
emissions markets combine engineering models of emissions abatement, chemistry models of
pollution transport, and epidemiological dose-response models (e.g., Muller and Mendelsohn
2009). The limitations of this approach are underlined by our failure to find consistent evidence
of an impact of the NBP market on particulates air pollution, which the models (and the EPA)
projected as the primary channel for any health benefits. In contrast, this paper’s analysis is
conducted with the most comprehensive data file ever compiled on emissions, pollution
concentrations, defensive expenditures, and mortality rates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews ozone formation and the
NBP. Section III presents a simple model of defensive investments. Section IV describes data
sources and the analysis sample. Section V discusses the econometric models. Section VI reports
the results and Section VII conducts a cost-benefit analysis of the NBP and develops a measure
of willingness to pay for ozone reductions. Section VIII concludes.

II. Ambient Pollution and the NBP Emission Market

5

A. Ambient Pollution. The Clean Air Act was designed to control ambient levels of ozone and
five other pollutants that harm health. Ozone differs from the other pollutants in two important
ways. First, polluters do not emit ozone directly. Instead, ambient ozone concentrations are
governed by complex nonlinear photochemistry that depends on two chemicals precursors –
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) – and sunlight and heat. The
market we study operates only in summer because winter ozone levels in the Eastern U.S. are
low, and ozone spikes to high peaks on hot and sunny days.
Second, the health consequences of ozone are believed to occur from short-term exposure
to high levels (Lippman 2009). Ozone regulation has targeted these peak exposures, rather than
focusing on mean ozone levels. For example, the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
ozone primarily reflect the highest few readings of the year. Most epidemiological studies focus
on very short-term effects, though some evidence suggests that medium- or long-run effects are
larger (Jerrett et al. 2009). Hence, this market is most likely to affect health if it truncates the
right tail of the ozone distribution.

B. The NOx Budget Trading Program. As detailed in Appendix IV, an initial version of the NBP
operated in 1999-2002 and produced small declines in summer NOx emissions that are unlikely
to confound our analysis of the 2003-2008 NBP (see Appendix IV). A more stringent version of
the NBP then began in 2003 and operated until 2008.8 This market included 2,500 electricity
generating units and industrial boilers, though the 700 coal-fired electricity generating units in
the market accounted for 95 percent of all NBP NOx emissions (USEPA 2009b).
The NBP market was implemented partially in 2003 and fully in 2004-5. The 2003-2008
emissions market originally aimed to cover the eight Northeast states plus Washington DC, plus
11 additional Eastern states. Litigation in the Midwest, however, delayed implementation in the

8

In 2009, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) replaced this market. In 2010, the EPA proposed a Transport Rule
which would combine this NOx market with a market for SO2 emissions. In July 2011, the EPA replaced this
proposal with the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which regulates power plant emissions in 27 states with the goal of
decreasing ambient ozone and particulate levels.
6

11 additional states until May 31, 2004.9 Appendix Figure 1 shows the division of states by NBP
participation status in the subsequent analysis.10
Accordingly, the EPA allocated about 150,000 tons of NOx allowances in 2003, 650,000
tons in 2004, and about 550,000 tons in each of the years 2005-2008.11 Each state received a set
of permits and chose how to distribute those permits to affected sources. Once permits were
distributed, affected sources could buy and sell them through open markets. A single emissions
cap affected the entire market region, though firms could bank allowances for any future year.
Many firms banked allowances: In each year of the market, about 250,000 tons of allowances
were saved unused for subsequent years (USEPA 2009a). At the end of each market season, each
source had to give the EPA one allowance for each ton of NOx emitted. Seventy percent of units
complied by using emissions controls (e.g., low NOx burners or selective catalytic reduction),
and the remainder complied exclusively by holding emissions permits (USEPA 2009b). The
mean resulting permit price in the emissions market was $2,523 per ton of NOx ($2015). This
reflects the marginal abatement cost of the last unit of NOx abated, and we use it to develop an
upper bound on the aggregate abatement cost of the NBP.

III. Model of Willingness-to-Pay
We build upon the canonical Becker-Grossman health production function to highlight the role
of defensive investments in the measurement of willingness-to-pay for clean air (Becker 1965;
Grossman 1972). This model shows that accurate measurement of willingness-to-pay requires
knowledge of both how pollution affects health outcomes such as mortality and how it affects
defensive investments that maintain health but otherwise generate no utility, such as medications.
9

The 1999-2002 Ozone Transport Commission Market included Connecticut, Delaware, DC, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. On May 1, 2003, the NBP emissions cap
applied to the exact same set of states. On May 31, 2004, it also began applying to Alabama (excluding a southern
region of the state), Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia. Missouri entered the market in 2007.
10
The main results define all states in the NBP cap-and-trade region as treated, they exclude states that are adjacent
to NBP states, and they define remaining states as comparison (non-treated). We exclude states adjacent to the NBP
region from the main results because their treatment status is ambiguous (see Appendix IV for details).
11
All tons in the paper refer to short tons and not metric tons.
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Assume the sick days s(d) which a person suffers depends on the dose d of pollution she
is exposed to. The effective dose d(c,a) depends on the ambient concentration c of the pollutant
and on the defensive behavior a. Defensive behaviors can be taken before or after pollution is
ingested—in the terminology of Graff-Zivin and Neidell (2013), defenses include both averting
and mitigating activities. Substituting provides the following health production function:
(1)

s = s(c,a)
People gain utility from consumption of a general good X (whose price is normalized to

1), leisure f, and health. Budgets are constrained by non-labor income I, the wage rate pw,
available time T, and the price pa of defensive investments: maxX,f,au(X,f,s) s.t. I + pw(T – f – s) ≥
X + paa. Assuming an interior solution to the maximization problem, we can rearrange the total
derivative of the health production function (1) to give the following expression for the partial
effect of ambient pollution on sick days:
(2)

s ds  s a * 



c dc  a c 

This expression is useful because it underscores that the partial derivative of sick days with
respect to pollution is equal to the sum of the total derivative and the product of the partial
derivative of sick days with respect to defensive behavior (assumed to have a negative sign) and
the partial derivative of defensive behavior with respect to pollution (assumed to have a positive
sign). In general, complete data on defensive behavior is unavailable, so most empirical
investigations of pollution on health (see, e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2003) reveal ds/dc, rather
than ∂s/∂a. As equation (5) demonstrates, the total derivative is an underestimate of the desired
partial derivative. Indeed, it is possible that virtually all of the response to a change in pollution
comes through changes in defensive behavior and that there is little impact on health outcomes;
in this case, an exclusive focus on the total derivative would lead to a substantial understatement
of the health effect of pollution. The full impact therefore requires either estimation of ∂s∂da,
which is almost always infeasible, or of ds/dc and ∂a*/∂c. We emphasize that defenses used both
before and after pollution is ingested (i.e., averting and mitigating activities) are
8

indistinguishable in the willingness-to-pay expression (2). From the view of social welfare, the
distinction between them is not relevant.
To express the marginal willingness to pay for clean air wc in dollars, we manipulate the
previous expressions to obtain the following decomposition:
(3)

ds   a *   u / s ds 


wc   p w
   pa

dc  
c    dc 


Expression (3) shows that the marginal willingness to pay for clean air includes three terms. The
first is the effect of pollution on productive work time, valued at the wage rate. The third is the
disutility of sickness, valued in dollars. This third component includes mortality. The second is
the cost of defensive investments, valued at their market price. This second component is the
aspect of willingness-to-pay that existing research has not measured. It is important to note that
medications are not a complete measure of defensive investments against air pollution. The
paper’s primary empirical goal is to develop a measure of marginal willingness to pay that is
based on ds/dc and ∂a*∂/c.
Our setting has two important deviations from this neoclassical model: markups and
moral hazard. Branded medications generally have low marginal cost and high markups that
reflect intellectual property rights. Hence, it is natural to question whether changes in medication
purchases amount to a transfer from consumers to drug firms, and not a social cost. In the shortrun, this is indeed the case. However, pharmaceutical firms must invest socially valuable
resources to develop medications that treat conditions exacerbated by air pollution. With lower
levels of air pollution, fewer resources would be spent to develop these medications. Thus over
the long run, there is a social benefit (see Finkelstein 2004) for a similar induced innovation
process.
The second important deviation is that the marginal cost to the consumer is smaller than
the price, by 80 percent in our data, because consumers with insurance generally pay a
copayment or deductible for medications. We report medication cost results both using the full
transacted price for medications (which is more accurate than the published or wholesale price)
9

and using the copayment. The copayment may provide the best measure of a person’s private
willingness-to-pay for her own medications. Since an insurer must pay the remainder of the
medication cost, the full cost of the medication may more accurately represent socialwillingness-to-pay for the cost of the medications.

IV. Data
This analysis has compiled an unprecedented set of data files to assess the impacts of the NOx
Budget Program. Although market-based instruments are viewed as among the most important
contributions of economics to environmental policy, to the best of our knowledge this study
represents the first time any analysis has linked ex post health measurements directly to
emissions and air quality measures in order to evaluate an emissions market.
Medications. We use confidential data on medication and hospital admissions from
MarketScan. MarketScan contracts with large employers to obtain all insurance-related records
for their employees and their dependents including children. The data report the purchase county,
date, the medication’s National Drug Code (NDC), and the money paid from consumer and
insurer to the medication provider.
We use data from all persons in the 19 covered firms which appear in all years, 20012007, of MarketScan, which is the largest panel the data allow us to obtain with these firms. This
extract includes over 22 million person-season year observations, and over 100 million separate
medication purchases. Because the distribution of persons across counties is skewed, we report
all values as rates per 1,000 people, and use generalized least squares (GLS) weights equal to the
square root of the relevant MarketScan population. Because the other datasets become available
in 1997 but medication data become available in 2001, for non-medication results we report
parameter estimates both with data for the period 1997-2007 and for the period 2001-2007.
Medications are not linked to a single International Classification of Disease (ICD) code.
In the subsequent analysis, we follow the convention in the pollution-health literature and treat
respiratory and cardiovascular related episodes as most likely to be affected by air pollution. We
10

define an NDC as respiratory if it satisfies any of three criteria: (1) if it is listed in the Third
Treatment Guidelines for Asthma (NHLBI 2007); (2) in a recent New England Journal of
Medicine guide to asthma treatment (Fanta 2009); or (3) in the standard industry publication for
medication characteristics (PDR 2006) as indicated for asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. We identify cardiovascular medications by their
corresponding therapeutic group in Red Book (PDR 2006).12
This broad approach to identifying respiratory and cardiovascular drugs is the most
appropriate we can discern. Nonetheless, because doctors prescribe medications to treat
conditions for which the medications are not indicated, some of these medications were probably
prescribed for non-respiratory and non-cardiovascular conditions. Moreover, it is also likely that
medications prescribed for respiratory and cardiovascular conditions are not in this list. For
example, the three sources mentioned above that we use to define respiratory medications have
somewhat different categorization of which medications are respiratory. Internet searches for
respiratory medications also find medications which can be used for respiratory conditions, but
which are not listed as respiratory in any of the sources above.13 Additionally, Red Book
identifies a single therapeutic group for each National Drug Code. Since a medication may be
used to treat multiple conditions, medications in non-cardiovascular therapeutic groups may also
be used to treat cardiovascular conditions.
Hospitalizations. We count hospital admission costs as including all inpatient episodes
plus all emergency outpatient episodes. When a hospital visit has several associated procedures
each with its own ICD9 code, we take the mode procedure. Our measure of hospital costs
includes all charges from the hospital to the insurer and patient.

12

Red Book has no category for respiratory medications. Medication purchase rates are skewed and few countyseason values equal zero, so the main tables report medication regressions in logs, with values of zero excluded from
the regressions.
13
For example, dexamethasone is not listed as respiratory in any of our sources, but medical websites like the Mayo
Clinic’s list it is as used to treat asthma along with many other conditions including inflammation, allergies, arthritis,
blood or bone marrow problems, kidney problems, skin conditions, and multiple sclerosis. Similarly, isoflurane is
not listed as a respiratory condition in our data, as it is primarily used for anesthesia, but many medical journal
articles and other sources document its use for asthma.
11

Mortality. To measure mortality, we use restricted-access data on the universe of deaths
in the 1997-2007 period. These Multiple Cause of Death files (MCOD) come from the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and were accessed through an agreement between NCHS
and the Census Research Data Centers. These files contain information on the county, cause of
death, demographics, and date of each fatality.
Pollution Emissions. To measure pollution emissions, we extract daily totals of unit-level
NOx, SO2, and CO2 emissions for all states from the EPA’s Clean Air Markets Division. The
NOx emissions almost entirely come from CEMS and are quite accurate. Units which are part of
the Acid Rain Program must report NOx emissions throughout the year, while units in the NBP
must report NOx emissions only in the May 1 – September 30 period. Because we compare
summer versus winter and East versus West, estimates in the paper use only data from Acid Rain
Units. However, in the examined period, units in the NBP and not in the Acid Rain Program
make a very small share of NOx emissions.
Ambient Pollution. We use a few criteria to select ambient pollution monitoring data from
the EPA’s detailed Air Quality System. Many EPA monitors operate for limited timespans and
may change reporting frequency in response to pollution (Henderson 1996). The main analysis
uses a fairly strenuous selection rule of limiting to monitors which have valid readings for at
least 47 weeks in all years 1997-2007. Appendix Table 1 shows that we obtain similar results
with a weaker monitor selection rule. For ozone, we focus on a concentration measure the EPA
regulates: for each day, we calculate an “8-hour value” as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean
within the day. We also calculate the number of days on which this 8-hour value was equal to or
greater than 65 ppb, which is an indicator of high-ozone days.
Weather. We compiled daily maximum and minimum temperature, total daily
precipitation, and dew point temperature data from records of the National Climate Data Center
Summary of the Day files (File TD-3200). Appendix III explains the procedure chosen to ensure
accurate and complete weather readings.

12

Summary Statistics. Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and county
representation for the main variables in our analysis. Of the 2,539 counties in our preferred
sample, medication and hospitalization data are available for 96 percent of these counties, which
had a population of 261 million in 2004.14 Ambient ozone data are only available for only 168
counties, but these counties are heavily populated and their 2004 population was 97 million. Data
on particulates less than 2.5 micrometers (PM2.5) are available in 298 counties (population 144
million) and data on particulates less than 10 micrometers (PM10) are available for 39 counties
(population of 26 million).
The summary statistics in Table 1 also provide a benchmark to measure the economic
importance of medications and the emissions market. In summer, ozone averages 48 ppb. The
2010 proposed EPA air quality standard stipulated that a county could have no more than 3 days
over a total of three years which exceed 60-70 ppb. Table 1 shows that during the sample period,
24 days every summer exceed 65 ppb in the typical county. On average during this time, the
average person spent $378 per summer on medications, and about $600 on hospital admissions.
In unreported results, we also investigated potential unobserved variables in the
observational associations between ozone and health. We divided all counties with ozone data
into two sets—one set with mean summer ozone above the national median (“high ozone”), and
another with mean summer ozone below the national median (“low ozone”). All ambient
pollutant measures except carbon monoxide have significantly higher levels in the high-ozone
counties. Temperature, precipitation, and dew point temperature are lower in high-ozone
counties. The finding that so many of these observed county characteristics covary with ozone
suggests that an observational association of ozone with health is likely to reflect the
contributions of other unobserved variables and may explain the instability of the estimated
health-ozone relationship that has plagued the previous literature. It is apparent that the
estimation of the causal effect of NOx emissions and ozone on health and defensive expenditures

14

While the U.S. has about 3,000 counties, our working sample is smaller since as discussed earlier, the main
sample excludes several states adjacent to the NBP region since their treatment status is ambiguous.
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requires a research design that isolates variation in NOx and ozone that is independent of
potential confounders.

V. Econometric Model
We use a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimator to isolate the causal effects
of the emissions market on pollution, defensive investments, and health, and use instrumental
variables to measure the “structural” effect of NOx emissions and ozone on the same outcomes.
The DDD estimator exploits three sources of variation in the emission and health data. First, we
compare the years before and after the NBP’s operation. Eight states plus Washington DC
initiated this market in 2003, while 11 other states joined in 2004. This market did not operate
before 2003. Second, 19 states plus Washington DC participated in the NBP while twenty-two
other states did not participate and were not adjacent to a NBP state (see Appendix Figure 1).
Third, the NBP market only operated during the summer, so we compare summer versus winter.
Specifically, we estimate the following model:
(7)

Ycst   11( NBP Operating ) cst  Wcst'    ct   st   cs   cst

Here, c references county, s indicates season, and t denotes year. The year is divided into
two seasons, summer and winter. Summer matches the NBP’s operation period of May 1September 30. The variables Ycst are pollution emissions, ambient pollution concentrations,
medication costs, hospitalization costs, and mortality rates. Because the NBP market started
partway in 2003, we define Post=0.5 in 2003 and Post=1.0 in 2004 through 2007. Appendix
Tables 1, 2, and 4 show similar results for all natural alternatives to this definition. All
regressions limit the sample to a balanced panel of county-season-years. Our main results cluster
standard errors by state-season, but the Appendix reports alternative levels of clustering, with
similar conclusions.
Since temperature has nonlinear effects on health, it is important to adjust for weather
flexibly. The matrix of weather controls, Wcst, includes measures of precipitation, temperature,
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and dew point temperature (a measure of humidity). For temperature and humidity, we calculate
20 quantiles of the overall daily distribution.15 For each county-season-year observation in the
data, we then calculate the share of days that fall into each of the 20 quantiles.
To operationalize the DDD estimator, the specification includes all three sets of two-way
fixed effects. The vector μct is a complete set of county by year fixed effects, which account for
all factors common to a county within a year (e.g., local economic activity and the quality of
local health care providers). The season-by-year fixed effects, ηst, control for all factors common
to a season and year: for example, they would adjust for the development of a new drug to treat
asthma that was sold in NBP and non-NBP states. Finally, the county-by-season fixed effects,
νcs, allow for permanent differences in outcomes across county-by seasons. This specification
estimates the difference in outcomes between a world with all NOx regulations including the
NBP (including the Ozone Transport Commission market, RECLAIM, ozone nonattainment
designations, and others) versus a world with all NOx regulations except the NBP. Other
regulations did apply to NOx emissions from power plants in this period; for example, the
Massachusetts State Implementation Plan adopted strict annual (though not summer-only) NOx
emissions standards for power plants in 2001, which began applying between 2004 and 2008.
Such policies help explain the downward trends observed in both Winter and in non-NBP states
in Appendix Figure 2. Our identifying assumption is that such policies did not change
differentially in NBP versus non-NBP states, in Winter versus Summer, over this period.
The parameter of interest is γ1, associated with the variable 1(NBP Operating)cst. As noted
earlier, this takes the value of 0.5 for all NBP states in 2003, when the market was operating in 9
of the 20 states, and a value of 1 in 2004 and all subsequent years in these states. The 2003 value
is assigned to all NBP states, rather than just states which entered the market in 2003, because
NOx and ozone travel far and emissions reductions in one NBP state affected ambient ozone in
other NBP states. After adjustment for the fixed effects, γ1 captures the variation in outcomes
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The lower quantiles of the precipitation distribution all equal zero, so for simplicity we specify the precipitation
control as the mean level of precipitation in each county-year-summer.
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specific to NBP states, relative to non-NBP states, in years when the NBP operated, relative to
before its initiation, and in the summer, relative to the winter. This only leaves variation in the
outcomes at the level at which the market operated.
Separate measures of the market’s effect in each year provide additional useful
information. Hence, for most outcomes, we also report the parameters α1997… α2007 from the
following model:
(8)

Ycst 

2007

  1( NBP State and Summer )

t 1997

t

cs

 W cst'    ct   st   cs   cst

where 1(NBP State and Summer)cs=1 for all summer observations from NBP states, regardless of
the year. We plot the αt’s in event study style figures to provide visual evidence on the validity of
the conclusions from the estimation of equation (7).16 Importantly, the event study style graphs
provide an opportunity to assess whether there were pre-NPB trends in outcomes that were
specific to NBP States after nonparametric adjustment for all county by year, season by year, and
county by season factors. Appendix Figure 4 reports 20 separate event study graphs that cover all
main outcomes in the paper.
Finally, we report on the results from the estimation of instrumental variables versions of
(9)

Ycst  NOxcst  Wcst'   ct   st   cs  cst

where the subscripts have the same meaning as in equations (7) and (8) and the equation includes
the same set of fixed effects. Here, Ycst is restricted to measures of medication purchases and
mortality rates. The key difference is that NOx emissions in county c, season s, and year t is an
endogenous regressor and 1(NBP Operating)cst from equation (7) is used as an instrumental
variable. We demonstrate below that there is a strong first-stage in that the instrumental variable
predicts NOx emissions. The exclusion restriction is the other necessary condition for a valid
instrumental variable and, conditional on the full set of two-way fixed effects, we believe that it
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The data on medication purchases and hospitalization begins in 2001, so for these outcomes, the event-study
graphs are for the period 2001-2007.
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is credible to assume that 1(NBP Operating)cst only affects medication purchases and mortality
rates through NOx emissions.
The case for the validity of the exclusion restriction when ozone is the endogenous
variable is plausible. However, it is less clear cut for two reasons: 1) the link between the NBP
and ambient ozone is less direct since it is mediated by complex nonlinear photochemistry and
this can make for a noisy relationship; and 2) air quality models show that atmospheric NOx can
transform into particulates air pollution that is harmful to human health (Pandis and Seinfeld
2006). Nevertheless, there is a straightforward channel and we also report on versions of
equation (9) where ambient ozone, instead of NOx emissions, is the endogenous variable, and
1(NBP Operating)cst is the instrumental variable. Reliable estimation of either, or both, versions
of equation (9) would be of tremendous practical value for policy and, more broadly, so that this
paper’s results can be applied to other settings.

VI. Results
A. Emissions. The NOx Budget Trading Program required affected units to reduce NOx emissions
during the summer. Figure 2 (A) shows an event study graph measuring the difference between
NOx emissions in the Eastern and Western U.S. and in summer versus winter, separately by year,
with the year 2002 normalized to take the value zero. The value for 2001 is almost exactly equal
to zero, which is consistent with a lack of pre-trends in NOx emissions. Figure 2 (A) shows that
in the year 2003, when the NBP market began, NOx emissions fell by 0.2 thousand tons per
county-season-year; and by the later years of the NBP, NOx emissions had fallen by a total of 0.3
to 0.4 thousand tons per county-season-year. Panel A of Table 2 reports estimates of several
versions of equation (7) for pollution emissions measured at the county by season by year level.
Column (1) includes county-by-season, season-by-year, and state-by-year fixed effects. Column
(2) adds binned weather controls. Column (3) replaces the state-by-year fixed effects with
county-by-year fixed effects, which causes the parameters of interest to be identified from
comparisons of summer and winter emissions within a county by year. Column (4) restricts the
17

sample to 2001-2007, which are the when medication and hospitalization data are available.
Since emissions readings are totals rather than averages, the regressions are unweighted.
The entries in row 1 report the parameter estimate and standard error associated with the
variable 1(NBP Operating)cst. The results suggest that the NBP market decreased NOx emissions
in the average county by 330-430 tons. This corresponds to a total decrease of between 391,000
and 510,000 tons of NOx per summer.
It is informative to compare these statistics against other reports of the NBP’s impacts on
NOx emissions. The USEPA (2008) estimates that a combination of the NBP and its smaller
predecessor, the NOx SIP Call, decreased ozone season NOx emissions by a larger amount,
750,000 tons. Their estimate comes from a time-series comparison of the years 2000 and 2007.
Reconciling this with our smaller estimate is straightforward. A time-series comparison of the
years 2002 and 2007 implies a smaller decrease of somewhat over 500,000 tons. Accounting for
secular trends in emissions, which were present in both summer and winter seasons and in the
NBP and non-NBP states (Appendix Figure 2), suggests an estimate within our range of 391,000
to 510,000 tons.17
We also measure whether the NBP market affected emissions of pollutants other than
NOx. Two economic reasons explain why the market might have affected emissions of such copollutants. If permits for NOx emissions cost enough that the market caused natural gas units to
displace electricity generation from relatively dirty coal-fired units, then the market could have
decreased emissions of pollutants other than NOx. Second, complementarity or substitutability of
NOx with other pollutants in electricity generation could lead units to change emissions of other
pollutants. Rows 2 and 3 in Panel A of Table 2 indicate that NBP did not substantially affect SO2
or CO2 emissions. Our preferred estimates in column (3) are not statistically significant, though
17

Our emissions totals are not numerically equal to those of at least the EPA’s year 2008 NBP report for a few
reasons: their report describes Missouri sources as regulated by an NBP in all years (whereas in reality those sources
were only regulated in 2007; we exclude Missouri from our main analysis); we treat all of Alabama as in the NBP
while they exclude some sources in southern Alabama; and we include only Acid Rain Units in the analysis since
they have high-quality continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS) data for summer and winter and pre-NBP
years, while the EPA’s reports, which focus only on summer emissions, also include the fairly few NBP sources that
are not in the Acid Rain Program.
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some of the other estimates are. However, all of the estimates are economically small; for
example, the point estimates in the preferred specifications in columns (3) and (4) are about 3%
to 5% of the mean from years 2001-2, or a tenth of our proportional estimate for NOx. Event
study graphs in Appendix Figure 4(B) suggest quantitatively similar conclusions. The SO2 graph,
for example, suggests a decrease of 0.1 thousand tons per county-season, and the CO2 graph
suggests a decrease of approximately 20 thousand tons per county-season.

B. Ambient Pollution. Panel B in Table 2 reports on how the NBP affected ambient
concentrations of ozone and the other pollutants that are most heavily regulated under the Clean
Air Act. Columns (1) – (4) have identical specifications to those in Panel A, except that they are
weighted by the number of pollution readings from the EPA’s ambient air quality monitors in a
given year by county. The column (5) estimates are from the same specification as in column (4),
except that they are weighted by county population, which will be the relevant weight in the
analysis of the impact of the NBP market on health outcomes (though defensive investments are
weighted by the population in the MarketScan survey).
Rows 4 and 5 of in Panel B reveal large and precisely estimated effects of the emissions
market on ground-level ozone concentrations (as measured by the maximum 8-hour value). The
richest specifications in columns (3) - (5) indicate that the NBP decreased mean summer ozone
by about 3 ppb (or 6% relative to the baseline average). Importantly, the NBP also decreased the
number of high-ozone days (days where the 8-hour value equals or exceeds 65 ppb) by 8.0 to 9.6
days per summer (or 33%-40% of the baseline average). The corresponding event study figure
for the 8-hour ozone reading (Appendix Figure 3 C) exhibits some evidence of differential preexisting trends in summer ozone concentrations in NBP states. Accounting for these differences
increases the magnitude of the NBP’s estimated reduction on ozone concentrations, although
these models are more demanding of the data and so the estimates are less precise, but remain
significant at the conventional level.
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Given the large effect of the NBP on the number of days with ozone equaling or
exceeding 65 ppb, we also analyze the market’s impact on the density function for daily ozone
concentrations to explore where in the daily ozone distribution the NBP affected concentrations.
Figure 2 (B) reports these results; the main finding is that the market reduced the number of
summer days with relatively high-ozone concentrations (i.e. greater than 60 ppb) and increased
the number of days with ozone concentrations less than 60 ppb. It is noteworthy that the EPA has
experimented with daily ozone standards of 65, 75, and 85 ppb in recent years and that the
identifying variation in ozone concentrations comes from this part of the distribution where there
is great scientific and policy uncertainty.18
Rows 6-8 in Panel B of Table 2 test for impacts of NBP on carbon monoxide (CO),
sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Appendix Figure 4(B) shows the
corresponding event study graphs. CO emissions come primarily from transportation, so it is not
surprising that the regressions fail to find evidence that the NBP affected CO emissions; the
graphs bear this out. Further, there is no regression evidence of an impact on SO2, though the
event study graph has some evidence of pre-trends differences for this outcome. NOx is a
standard term used to describe a mix of two compounds—nitric oxide (NO) and NO2, a pollutant
subject to its own regulations. Row 8 shows that the NBP market decreased ambient NO2 levels
by 6-7 percent, relative to the baseline, though NO2 has limited or possibly no effect on health
(Lippman 2009). The event study graph shows some decrease though is less clear than for ozone.
The impact of the NBP on particulates concentrations is of special interest because
particulates can result from NOx emissions and are widely believed to be the most dangerous air
pollutant for human health (Pope, Ezzati, and Dockery 2009; Chay and Greenstone 2003; Chen
et al 2013). Further, before its implementation, the EPA estimated that 48-53 percent of the
projected health benefits from the NBP would come through the channel of reduced particulates
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Appendix Figure 3 (A) shows the number of days with ozone in each of six bins in the years before the NBP
program began. Appendix Figure 3 (B) shows event study graphs of the change in these counts due to the NBP.
These graphs also show that the change in ozone was largely among days with 60-100ppb, which are exactly the set
of days that regulation targets.
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concentrations (USEPA 1998). The impact of emitted NOx on ambient particulate matter is
theoretically ambiguous and depends on the level of other chemicals in the atmosphere (see
Appendix I).
Rows 9 and 10 of Panel B in Table 2 empirically examine the impact of the NBP market
on the concentrations of particles smaller than 10 micrometers (PM10) and 2.5 micrometers
(PM2.5), both of which are small enough to be respirable. The PM10 and PM2.5 monitoring
networks were just being erected in the late 1990s so to have meaningful samples it is necessary
to focus on the 2001-2007 period as in columns (4) and (5). Column (4), where the equation is
weighted by the number of monitor observations, provides limited evidence that the NBP
affected particulate matter. Alternatively, when the equation is weighted by population, as is the
case in the preferred defensive expenditures and health outcomes equations, the NBP is
associated with a 7% reduction in PM2.5. Because PM2.5 is believed to create substantial health
damages, however, the implications of this number for human health may be larger than this
modest change in ambient concentrations might suggest. In the smaller sample of counties with
PM10 monitors, we fail to find evidence of a statistically significant change in PM10. The row 9
and 10 results are inconclusive about whether the NBP affected particulates concentrations. The
event study graphs in Appendix Figure 4(B) also show no clear evidence of a decrease in
ambient particulates.
Overall, the large reduction in NOx emissions caused by the NBP market and the rest of
the evidence in Table 2 is generally supportive of the premise that the effect of the NBP on
health occurs primarily through its effect on ozone concentrations (see additional sensitivity
analyses in Appendix V). Emissions of pollutants with important effects on health such as CO
and SO2 were unaffected by the NBP. However, the mixed estimates of the effect of the NBP on
PM2.5 (some statistically significant, some not) suggest that the subsequent 2SLS estimates of the
effects of ozone on defensive expenditures and health outcomes derived from the variation in
ozone induced by the NBP should be interpreted cautiously, because they may reflect the impact
of ozone or particulates, or a combination of the two pollutants. We therefore focus more on the
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instrumental variables estimates of the effects of NOx emissions on medication purchases and
mortality.

C. Defensive Investments. Table 3 statistically summarizes the reduced-form effect of the NBP
market on log medication costs. The richest specification in columns (3) and (4) indicates that
the NBP reduced total medication costs by 1.5 to 1.6 percent. The estimate is precise with the
full set of controls and has similar magnitude but less precision with less detailed controls.19
Finally, it is worth noting that the column (4) estimate is derived from the subsample of counties
with ozone pollution monitors, which is used for the instrumental variables estimation below;
this reduces the sample size from 30,926 to 2,338.
Figure 3 (A) shows the event study graph for log of respiratory and cardiovascular
medication expenditures from the estimation of equation (8). The event study suggests that the
NBP market decreased medication expenditures in these categories by nearly 2 percentage
points. This impact was roughly constant and is marginally significant in individual years.
Importantly, there is no evidence of meaningful differences in the trend in summertime
medication purchases between NBP and non-NBP states in advance of the market’s initiation.
The picture is broadly similar though less precise for the smaller set of firms available over the
period 2000-2007 (Appendix Figure 4B).
We also measure medication purchases separately by cause. As discussed above, the
allocation of medications to causes is inexact—doctors can prescribe a medication for many
purposes, and the MarketScan data do not identify the cause for which a specific medication was
prescribed. The goal of this exercise is to test whether the decline in medication purchases was
evident among respiratory and cardiovascular medications (although the imprecision of the
assignment of causes to medications means that there are good reasons to expect an impact in
19

County-by-year fixed effects add precision in these estimates. Because the medication data are from MarketScan
and represent workers in the balanced panel of firms, county-by-year fixed effects address both local labor market
shocks and firm- and factory-specific events like layoffs or mass hiring. Consistent with GLS providing an efficient
response to heteroscedasticity, the unweighted estimate for log medication costs per capita is similar but less precise,
at -0.011 (0.017).
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other categories). The column (3) estimate in row 2 indicates that the NBP decreased
expenditures on respiratory and cardiovascular medications by a statistically significant 2.1
percent. In the smaller sample of counties with ozone monitors in column (4), the point estimate
is marginally different from zero and a similar point estimate to column (3). Expenditures on all
other medications also declined in all specifications. In the richest specification of column (3),
this decline is 1.4 percentage points and is modestly smaller than the decline for respiratory and
cardiovascular medications. Event study graphs for non-cardiovascular and non-respiratory
medications show much less evidence of a change than is apparent for cardiovascular and
respiratory medications (Appendix Figure 4B).
An important question is the extent to which medications are a defense rather than just
another health expense. Almost all of the previous literature reports on direct health outcomes
(e.g., mortality rates, incidence of asthma attacks, and lung functioning). Following guidance
from the medical literature (e.g., Fanta 2009), our paper’s argument is that all of these health
conditions are a function of ambient pollution and compensatory adaptations or defenses that
include pharmaceutical purchases and a wide range of other costly actions. The share of
willingness-to-pay accounted for by these defenses has essentially been unmeasured previously
across a wide variety of settings; as a result, current measures of willingness to pay are
incomplete and downward biased by an unknown magnitude. Appendix II discusses this question
in detail, and while we argue that all medications are defensive, Appendix Table 2 reports results
indicating that the NBP led to reductions in purchases of both short-acting acute and long-acting
control respiratory medications; only the long-term control estimate is statistically significant.

D. Hospital Visits and Mortality.
Hospital Visits. Because we seek to compare defensive costs against direct health costs,
we also measure how the market affected hospital visits and mortality. Due to the large number
of county-year-season observations with zero hospitalization costs, we focus on the level rather
than the log of per capita hospitalization costs.
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Overall, our conclusion from these results is that we do not detect meaningful effects of
the NBP on hospitalization costs and we do not pursue this outcome further (Appendix Table 3).
We emphasize however that the MarketScan data exclude uninsured, Medicare, and Medicaid
patients. These groups are included in some studies which find effects of ozone on
hospitalization (Currie and Neidell 2005, Lleras-Muney 2010), and are believed to experience
the largest impacts from high ambient ozone levels (ALA 2013). For these reasons, estimates of
the effect of the NBP market on hospitalization (and potentially medications) could significantly
understate population average effects.20
Mortality. In most analyses of air pollution, mortality accounts for the largest share of the
regulatory benefits. The results in row 1 of Table 4 suggest that the NBP market decreased the
all-cause, all-age summertime mortality rate by about 1.5 to 2.2 deaths per 100,000 population,
depending on the sample, and would generally be judged to be statistically significant. The effect
in the subsample of counties with ozone monitors is larger (see column 4), indicating a reduction
of 5.2 deaths per 100,000 population.
Rows 2 through 4 of Table 4 divide the overall mortality rate by cause of death. Reading
across row 2, it is apparent that 32% to 57% of the decline in overall mortality is concentrated
among cardiovascular/respiratory deaths. Row 3 finds that the NBP also significantly decreased
death from non-respiratory and non-cardiovascular causes. In most specifications the difference
between the effects in rows 2 and rows 3 is smaller than one standard error, and the estimates are
statistically indistinguishable.
Research on other pollutants finds that most of the health consequences of particulate
matter are concentrated among respiratory and cardiovascular causes, although pathways for
ozone are less well understood. The finding that the NBP affected respiratory and cardiovascular
in addition to other causes is consistent with two hypotheses. One is that the NBP was correlated
with unobserved shocks which affected mortality, and the second hypothesis is that the NBP
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At the same time, the MarketScan medication and hospitalizations data include insured groups that may be more
prone than uninsured individuals to incur expenditures in response to health risks (Finkelstein et al. 2012).
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itself caused these changes in mortality. Row 4 of Table 4 provides an important fact in support
of the second hypothesis. Row 4 shows that the market had no effect on external (primarily
accidental) deaths, which is a reassuring placebo test.
Panel C of Table 4 breaks the entire population into four age groups and separately
estimates the effect of the NBP on each group’s mortality rate using the full sample. The richest
sample and specification in column (3) detects no statistically significant effect on the mortality
of persons aged 74 and below, although the point estimates imply that the market prevented 424
deaths within this group. The largest impact on mortality occurs among people aged 75 and
older. These results suggest that the NBP market prevented about 1,800 deaths each summer
among people 75 and older. This finding is confirmed visually by the event study graph in Figure
3 (B), although the estimates from individual years are noisy, and by the age-specific analyses in
Appendix Figure 4(B).
The age-group decomposition implies that the NBP prevented 2,237 summer deaths
annually. About 80 percent of these were among people aged over 75. By contrast, the overall
share of all summer deaths which occur among people aged over 75 is 55%, suggesting that the
elderly disproportionately benefited from the NBP.
An important question that Table 4 leaves unanswered is the gain in life expectancy
associated with these delayed fatalities. Indeed, the question of the magnitude of gains in life
expectancy is unanswered in almost all of the air pollution and health literature because it is
largely based on changes in mortality rates over relatively short periods of time (e.g., a few days
or a week). The difficulty is that it is possible and perhaps likely that the relatively sick benefited
and that their lifespans were extended only modestly, given their age. In the extreme, the NBP
might merely have moved the date of these deaths to the winter months immediately following
the market.21
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The paper’s triple difference estimator compares summer and winter deaths within a year. If some of the deaths
are displaced from summer to October-December of the same year, then the estimator will overstate the decline in
mortality.
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We explored two approaches to investigate the empirical relevance of this short-term
‘seasonal’ displacement hypothesis. First, we experimented with redefining each “year” to begin
on May 1 of one calendar year and conclude on April 30 of the following calendar year. This
redefined “year” compares each summertime season against the seven following months.
Second, we estimated differences-in-differences regressions where each observation represents a
calendar year (as opposed to a calendar-season-year), and where we measure the change in
mortality rates by NBP status pre vs. post. We also combined these two approaches to estimate
differences-in-differences models with the restructured year.
These approaches do not provide strong support for the short-term displacement
hypothesis. In most cases, the estimated effect of the market on mortality was negative and had
similar magnitude to the models reported in the paper, but these estimates were imprecise and we
could not reject the null hypothesis that the NBP had no long-run impact on mortality. Overall,
we conclude that this research design lacks power to measure the effect of ozone on life
expectancy beyond the five month length of the NBP’s summer season. Nevertheless, this
paper’s focus on the summertime mortality rate is an advance from the previous literature that
has primarily estimated how ozone affects same-day or same-week mortality rates.22

E. Instrumental Variables (IV). The preceding sections measure the reduced-form effects of the
NBP market on pollution, defenses, and health. We now turn to an IV approach to measuring the
effect of NOx emissions and ozone on defensive expenditures and mortality rates. The
interpretation of the IV estimates of the effect of NOx generated by the NBP market variation as
causal is straightforward: NOx is a pollutant controlled by regulation, and the estimated effects
on health and defenses are a direct result of the quasi-experimental change in NOx emissions.
Table 2 showed that changes in NOx are the primary channel for the large changes in ambient
ozone concentrations. However, changes in NOx – depending on the model specification -- also
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Currie and Neidell (2005) is an exception since they estimate monthly and quarterly mortality regressions.
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can lead to changes in other ambient pollutants, including PM2.5. Thus we underscore that
instrumental variable estimates of the effect of ozone should be interpreted more cautiously.
We report IV estimates for the effect of NOx on health for two different geographic
samples—all counties and the 24% of NBP counties with positive NOx emissions in summer
2002 that account for 44% of these states’ population. We refer to the second sample as,
“Counties with NOx Emissions.” Most counties lack power plants that produce NOx emissions so
the NBP could not have affected emissions in these counties, except by deterring entry; relatedly,
the first-stage estimate of the NBP’s effect on NOx is more powerful when excluding these zeros.
We emphasize estimates from the second sample, since it is ex ante expected to have more
statistical power. Of course we can only estimate IV regressions for ozone using the counties
with ozone monitors.
The first row of Panel A of Table 5 reports fixed effects estimates of the association
between NOx emissions and medication purchases (columns 1 - 2) and between measures of the
all-age mortality rate (columns 3 – 4). Rows 2 and 3 repeat the exercise for two different
measures of ambient ozone. The estimates are from separate regressions of the outcome on
alternative measures of NOx emissions (or ozone concentrations) and are adjusted for county-byseason fixed effects, county-by-year fixed effects, season-by-year fixed effects, detailed weather
controls, and each observation represents a county-year-season as in the prior analysis. Most of
these estimates are statistically insignificant, and exhibit sign and magnitude variability
(including perversely signed coefficients on mortality), suggesting little evidence of systematic
effects on medication purchases or mortality rates.
Panel B reports on the two-stage least squares (2SLS) or instrumental variables (IV)
estimates that are adjusted for the same controls as in the fixed effects specifications but the
endogenous variables (i.e., NOx emissions in thousands of tons, average 8-hour ozone
concentration, and the number of days equaling or exceeding 65 ppb) are instrumented using the
quasi-experimental variation generated by the NBP market. That is, we use the variable 1(NBP
Operating)cst as an instrument for NOx emissions, and for ambient ozone concentrations.
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The entries indicate a strong relationship between NOx emissions and medication
purchases. For example, the estimates based on the sample of counties with positive NOx
emissions imply that a 10 percentage point decline in NOx emissions relative to the Table 1 mean
of 0.52 leads to a 0.07 percentage point reduction in spending on all medications. The estimates
including all counties are larger, at 0.14 percentage points, though less precise. Both estimates
are substantially larger in magnitude than the analogous OLS ones in Panel A, which is
consistent with the possibilities that the OLS estimates are plagued by substantial confounding
and that NOx emissions are measured with error. The ozone entries imply that a 10 percentage
point decline in the average 8 hour ozone measure and a 10 percentage point decline in days with
ozone concentrations exceeding 65 ppb reduces all medication spending by 2.8 and 0.37
percentage points, respectively (both statistically significant).
The IV mortality estimates in columns (4) also imply large mortality effects of NOx
emissions and ozone concentrations.23 The estimates based on counties with NOx emissions
suggest that a 1 million ton increase in NOx emissions leads to 5 additional summertime deaths
per 100,000 people, or that a 10 percentage point decline in NOx leads to a reduction in the
mortality rate of 0.07 percentage points. The estimates for all counties are the same magnitude
though somewhat less precise. The estimates also indicate that a 1 ppb increase in the 8 hour
ozone concentration or 1 additional day with a concentration exceeding 65 ppb lead to 2.62 and
0.86 additional summertime deaths per 100,000 people, respectively; correspondingly, a 10
percentage point increase in 8-hour ozone or in days with ozone concentrations exceeding 65 ppb
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The first-stage regression for column (3) of Table 5 corresponds to column (5) of Table 2. For the other columns
of Table 5, the first stage regressions are as follows: for column (1), -0.704 (0.303); for column (2a), -1.500 (0.518);
for column (2b), -0.107 (0.051); for column (4a), -0.876 (0.274); for column (4b), -0.237 (0.095). The sample and
weighting (MarketScan versus total population) varies across these regressions. Appendix Table 7 reports 2SLS
estimates separately for respiratory and cardiovascular causes (Panel A), and for non-respiratory and noncardiovascular causes (Panel B). These 2SLS estimates by cause are somewhat less precise than the all-cause
estimates in Table 5, though they still show that a substantial portion of the health consequences of NOx emissions
or ozone exposure come through respiratory and cardiovascular causes.
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leads to a 3 or an 0.46 percentage point increase in summertime deaths per 100,000 people,
respectively.24
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to develop plausibly causal estimates
of the relationships between NOx emissions with health and defensive investments.25 Further if it
is appropriate to interpret the IV ozone estimates as causal, they would substantially alter our
understanding of the welfare consequence of exposure to ozone. For example, the most
prominent ozone-mortality study (Bell et al. 2004) finds an elasticity of weekly ozone with
respect to daily mortality rates that is smaller than the elasticity implied by Table 5.

VII. Calculating Welfare Impacts
This paper’s results allow us to conduct a simple cost-benefit analysis for the entire NBP, with
the caveat that data restrictions prevent us from measuring all health outcomes and defensive
expenditures. The estimates in Table 2 imply that the NBP market decreased NOx emissions by
427,000 tons per summer on average and the average cost of a NOx permit was $2,523/ton.26 The
permit price should reflect an upper bound on abatement costs per ton, because firms should only
use abatement technologies that cost less than the permit price. Thus, an upper bound estimate is
that the market caused firms to spend $1,076 million (2015$) annually to abate NOx (Table 6,
Column 4). Defining 2003 to have half a year of typical abatement costs, we obtain an upper
bound on 2003-2007 total abatement costs of $4.8 billion (=1,076 x 4.5).
We now turn to estimating the NBP’s social benefits. As we discussed above, it may
seem natural to assume that a change in pharmaceutical purchases are simply a transfer from
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The values in Table 5 all include the years 2001-2007. For mortality but not medications we can also estimate
results including years 1997-2007, and obtain generally similar results. With this longer time period, the 2SLS
estimate for the mortality effect of NOx emissions in all counties is 5.18 (3.50), or 2.67 (1.89) in counties with NOx
emissions. The 2SLS estimates for 8-hour ozone and ozone days above 65 ppb are 1.61 (0.76) and 0.48 (0.23),
respectively.
25
Holland et al. (2016) apply the Muller-Mendelsohn model to simulate the consequences of emissions from
Volkswagen vehicles. They do not estimate regressions directly linking observed NOx emissions to observed
outcomes like health.
26
The effect on NOx emissions is calculated by multiplying the estimated impact of NPB on NOx emissions (-0.36)
in thousand tons from Table 2, Column (3), by the number of counties in the NBP (1,185).
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consumers to pharmaceutical firms and thus have zero social cost. However, reductions in air
pollution concentrations decrease the demand for medications that protect individuals from air
pollution. Dynamically, this decline in demand will reduce the resources used to develop these
medication types and will allow these resources to be applied to more productive uses. We are
unaware of an empirically validated approach to socially valuing this reduction in drug purchases
but believe that it is defensible to assume that it is valued at their full cost, especially over long
time horizons; Table 6 adopts this assumption, and also reports the total change in copayments.
Column (1) of Table 6 Panel B reports the average annual reduction in medication
expenditures, as well as the sum over the NBP’s life. Specifically, we take the estimated 1.5%
reduction in medication purchases from the regression result in column (3) and row 1 of Table 3
and multiply that by the annual mean medication purchases. This calculation suggests that the
NBP market led to a decrease in medication expenditures of $820 million per year or $3.7 billion
when summed over the 4.5 years that the NBP operated. It is unclear whether this extrapolation
from the MarketScan population under- or over-states the effect on the full population.
The Table 4 mortality estimates imply that the market prevented about 2,200 deaths per
summer. The value of a statistical life (VSL) determines the monetary value assigned to these
deaths. To provide one approach to monetization, we use Ashenfelter and Greenstone’s (2004)
upper bound VSL of $2.27 million (2015$) for a prime age person and Murphy and Topel’s
(2006) method to develop estimates of the VSL for each age group in our analysis. This
adjustment is especially consequential in this setting where the avoided fatalities are largely
among individuals 75 and over. The implied VSLs are as follows: $2.3 million (infants), $1.78
million (ages 1-64), $0.7 million (ages 65-74), and $0.3 million (ages 75+). The application of
this approach implies that the value of the mortality avoided by the NBP is $1.1 billion per year,
or $4.8 billion in the period 2003-2007 (Table 6 Panel B).27

27

We thank Kevin Murphy and Bob Topel for sharing the data underlying Figure 3 of their paper. The VSL used
here is lower than the $8.7 million VSL ($2015) used by the EPA, which is not age-adjusted. Our primary goal is
not to endorse a specific VSL value, but to demonstrate the results that come from one choice of VSL and age30

The entries in Panels A and B of Table 6 provide the basis for a comparison of the costs
and benefits. The upper bound on the NBP’s aggregate abatement costs is $4.8 billion, but by
themselves the value of the reduced medication purchases of $3.7 billion nearly equals these
costs. At least in this context, defensive investments are economically important. Once the value
of the reduced rates of mortality is added in, the benefits of the market are nearly twice as large
as the upper-bound of its abatement costs (i.e., $8.5 billion in benefits and $4.8 billion in costs).
Thus the NBP’s social benefits easily exceeded its abatement costs.
We consider two alternatives to the benefit-cost analysis in column 5 Table 6. An
alternative measure of medication costs is copayments. The log change in copayments is almost
identical to the log change in total medication expenditures (see Appendix Table 2). Copayments
represent 21 percent of the total payment for medications (Table 1). Total copayment savings per
year are $150 million, or $676 million over the 2003-2007 NBP. A second alternative is to
calculate the upper-bound on the NBP market cost using other measures of the NBP allowance
price. An alternative estimate of market costs of $3,000 per ton implies an upper bound cost of
$1.3 billion per year, or $5.8 billion total over the 2003-2007 period.28 Under both alternatives,
medication costs represent an economically important proportion of the benefits and costs of the
NBP market, and excluding medication expenditures (which are only one component of
defensive investments) would substantially understate the market’s benefits. The magnitude of
the understatement varies with these assumptions.

adjustment. Using the $8.7 million VSL rather than the $2.27 million VSL implies that the mortality benefits of
NBP were larger: $5.3 billion per year or $23.9 billion for the 2003-2007 total.
28
This value slightly exceeds the average allowance price in the years 2002-2006. When the market opened in May
2003, allowance prices of different vintages ranged from $2250 to $5000 per ton. Prices of all vintages fell rapidly
during the first year to below $3000. In the following years 2004-2006, allowance prices were fairly stable at
between $2000 and $3000 per ton. In 2007 all allowance prices declined to $1000 per ton.
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Estimates of willingness to pay for reductions in NOx emissions have considerable policy
relevance since NOx is the pollutant that policymakers can regulate directly, whereas ozone is
only formed through complicated chemical reactions involving other pollutants. Table 6’s Panel
C reports on estimated willingness to pay (WTP) for a reduction of one million tons of NOx
emissions and its component parts.29 Based on estimates from counties with NOx emissions, each
1 million ton decrease in summertime NOx emissions in the NBP states annually saves about
$0.6 billion in medication expenditures and roughly 8,000 premature summertime deaths, with
an estimated value of $3.9 billion in mortality benefits (Table 6, Panel C); the total WTP is thus
about $4.5 billion. The alternative estimated WTP of $4.8 billion, based on estimates from the
full sample of counties, is qualitatively identical. These figures are underestimates if other
categories of well-being or defensive expenditures respond to changes in NOx emissions.
Table 6 also reports estimates of willingness to pay for a reduction in ozone, but they
must be interpreted cautiously due to uncertainty about the validity of the exclusion restriction.30
The IV ozone results suggest that each 1 ppb decrease in the mean 8-hour summer ozone
concentration in the NBP states is worth approximately $1.9 billion in social benefits annually.
Similarly, one fewer day per summer in the NBP states with an ozone concentration exceeding
65 ppb would yield roughly $600 million of benefits annually (Table 6, Panel D).

VIII. Conclusions

29

The value in column (2) comes from multiplying together the IV estimates of the effect of NOx emissions on log
medication costs (Table 5), the mean medication expenditure per person-season (Table 1), and the mean population
in the NBP states in the years 2003-2007 (136 million). The value in column (2) comes from multiplying the IV
estimates of the effects of NOx emissions on the mortality rate (Table 5) by the total population in the NBP states.
The value in column (3) comes from by taking the mean willingness to pay per death prevented from Panel B of
Table 6, and multiplying it by the change in number of deaths from column (2) of Table 6.
30
The approach for calculating the ozone benefits in Panel D of Table 6 is similar to the methodology for
calculating the NOx benefits in Panel C of Table 6, and is described above. It is worth noting that estimates of the
benefits of the NBP, NOx emissions, and ozone for mortality and medications do not have identical samples since
not all counties have ozone monitors, and that medications data are available only beginning in 2001.
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Theoretical models make clear that willingness to pay (WTP) for well-being in a variety of
contexts is a function of factors that enter the utility function directly (e.g., the probability of
mortality, school quality, etc.) and the costly investments that help to determine these factors.
One approach to developing measures of WTP is to find a single market that captures
individuals’ full valuation, as can be the case with property markets under some assumptions
(see, e.g., Chay and Greenstone 2005; Greenstone and Gallagher 2008). All too frequently
though, the data and/or a compelling research design for the key market outcomes are
unavailable, making it necessary to develop measures of WTP by summing its components.
However, across a wide variety of applied literatures, the empirical evidence on WTP has
almost exclusively focused on the factors that enter the utility function directly. The resulting
measures of willingness to pay are thus generally underestimated and the extent of this
underestimation is unknown. This paper has demonstrated that defensive expenditures are an
important part of willingness to pay for air quality. Indeed in the context of the NOx Budget
Program, the improvement in air quality generates reductions in medication purchases that are
close to an upper bound estimate of the abatement cost. A fruitful area for research is to explore
whether individuals’ compensatory behavior and resulting defensive investments account for
such a large fraction of willingness to pay in other settings.
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Figure 1. Total Daily NOX Emissions in the NBP-Participating States
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Notes: Figure 1 shows average total daily NOx emissions in the NBP participating states in 200102 and 2005-07. These estimates are obtained an OLS regression of NOx emissions on 6 day-ofweek indicators and a constant. The values in the graph equal the constant plus the regression
residuals, so that the graph depicts fitted values for the reference category (Wednesday). Total
daily NOx emissions on Y-axis are measured in thousands of tons. The sample includes
emissions from all the Acid Rain Units. NBP participating states include: Alabama, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. The NBP operated only in Northeastern states
on May 1 of 2003, and expanded to the other states on May 31 of 2004. See the text for more
details.
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Figure 2. NBP Market Impact on NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Pollution
(A) Event Study for NOx Emissions, 1997-2007
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Notes: The estimates in Figure 2 Panel (A) are from an event study regression for NOx emissions
(measured in thousand of tons and observed at the county*year*season) where the estimates for
year 2002 are restricted to have a value of 0. The regression includes detailed weather controls
and a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects. The standard errors
underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season level. In
Panel (B), the bins represent to 6 categories of ozone 8-hour values, corresponding to the number
of days per summer where the ozone 8-hour value is 0-20 ppb, 20-40 ppb, 40-60 ppb, etc. The
ozone 8-hour value is measured as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean of hourly values within
each day. The coefficients reported in Figure 2 Panel (B) are from a separate regression for each
bin that includes detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year, and
county*season fixed effects. The regression is weighted by the number of ozone readings in each
county*season*year. The standard errors underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines)
are clustered at the state-season level. The asterisk on the 80-100 category denotes the
nonattainment air quality standard during the NBP years (85 ppb).
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Figure 3. Impact of the NBP Market on Defensive Expenditures Health Outcomes
(A) Event Study for Log Respiratory + Cardiovascular Medication Costs Per Capita
($2015)
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(B) Event Study for Respiratory + Cardiovascular Mortality Rate
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Notes: The estimates in Figure 3 Panel (A) are from an event study regression for log medication
costs per capita (respiratory and cardiovascular medications only), and the estimates in Figure 3
Panel (B) are from an event study regression for mortality rates per 100,000 population
(respiratory and cardiovascular causes only). In both regressions, the estimates for year 2002 are
restricted to have a value of 0. The regressions include detailed weather controls and a full set of
county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects, and are weighted by county
population (Panel (A) uses MarketScan population and Panel (B) uses total population). The
standard errors underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the stateseason level. Medication costs are in 2015 dollars, deflated using the BLS CPI for urban
consumers.
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Table 1. Mean Summer Values of the Pollution, Weather, and Health Variables, 2001-2007
Counties With
Data
(1)

Mean
(2)

s.d.
(3)

2,539
2,539
2,539

0.52
1.50
384

(1.99)
(6.52)
(1,299)

168
168
110
125

48.06
23.60
11.45
0.44

(9.28)
(22.64)
(5.39)
(0.24)

298

13.33

(4.19)

Pollution Emissions (000's of Tons/Summer)
NOx Emissions
SO2 Emissions
CO2 Emissions
Air Quality (Ambient Pollution)
Ozone 8-Hour Value (ppb)
Ozone Days ≥65 (ppb)
NO2 (ppb)
CO (ppm)
3

PM 2.5 (μg/m )
3

39
27.28
(6.26)
PM 10 (μg/m )
150
3.26
(2.27)
SO2 (ppb)
Weather
Temperature (ºF)
2,539
70.59
(5.79)
Precipitation (1/100")
2,539
11.46
(5.37)
Dew Point Temp. (ºF)
2,539
57.77
(7.91)
Medication Costs ($ Per Person)
All
2,435
377.56
(338.66)
Copayment
2,435
79.10
(59.21)
Respiratory or Cardio.
2,435
122.67
(131.87)
Hospitalizations ($ Per Person)
All
2,435
593.93
(2,501.71)
Respiratory or Cardio.
2,435
120.57
(923.57)
Mortality (Deaths Per 100,000 People)
All
2,539
402.42
(121.32)
Respiratory or Cardio.
2,539
180.80
(69.93)
Notes: Medication and hospitalization costs are reported in 2015 dollars and deflated using the US CPI
for urban consumers. Emissions, medications, and deaths are totals per summer. Ambient pollution and
weather are mean summer values. Means are across counties (i.e., not weighted). All data is for the period
2001-2007.
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Table 2. Effect of the NBP Market on Emitted and Ambient Pollution
(1)
A. Pollution Emissions (000's of Tons per Summer)
1. NOx
-0.36***
(0.05)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.37***
(0.06)

-0.36***
(0.07)

-0.33***
(0.07)

-0.43***
(0.11)

2. SO2

-0.08**
(0.04)

-0.12*
(0.07)

-0.07
(0.05)

-0.07**
(0.03)

-0.05
(0.13)

3. CO2

-2.66
(4.33)

-20.57
(15.87)

-4.04
(5.89)

-12.43*
(6.59)

-79.96
(56.94)

-2.91***
(0.77)

-3.74***
(1.20)

-2.76***
(0.73)

-3.06***
(0.50)

-3.15***
(0.49)

-7.40***
(2.50)

-8.53***
(2.76)

-7.96**
(3.03)

-8.95***
(2.61)

-9.64***
(2.32)

-0.05**
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.04
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.03)

0.16
(0.12)

0.34
(0.24)

0.14
(0.20)

0.13
(0.18)

0.13
(0.14)

-1.13***
(0.21)

-0.92
(0.75)

-1.09***
(0.35)

-0.92**
(0.35)

-1.23**
(0.49)

9. PM 2.5 : Particulates Less than 2.5 Micrometers
(μg/m3)

-----

-----

-----

-0.31
(0.31)

-0.93***
(0.27)

10. PM 10 : Particulates Less than 10 Micrometers
(μg/m3)

-----

-----

-----

-1.18
(0.87)

-0.82
(1.05)

B. Air Quality (Ambient Pollution)
4. Ozone 8-Hour Value (ppb)
5. Ozone Days ≥ 65 (ppb)
6. CO: Carbon Monoxide (ppm)
7. SO2 : Sulfur Dioxide (ppb)
8. NO2 : Nitrogen Dioxide (ppb)

County-by-Season FE
x
x
x
x
x
Summer-by-Year FE
x
x
x
x
x
State-by-Year FE
x
x
County-by-Year FE
x
x
x
Detailed Weather Controls
x
x
x
x
Data Begins in 2001
x
x
Weighted by Emission/Pollution Monitors (B. only)
x
x
x
x
Weighted by Population
x
Notes:. The entries in Table 2 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation (7). Each
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season
fixed effects. Additional control variables are listed in the text. The reported standard errors are clustered at the
state-season level. Emitted pollutant variables (Panel A) are measured in thousand of tons and ambient pollutant
variables (Panel B) are mean values. Unless otherwise noted, the sample period begins in 1997. Ambient pollution
regressions (Panel B) are GLS weighted by square root of number of underlying pollution readings unless otherwise
noted. For emissions, the number of observations is 55,858 for emissions in columns (1) to (3) and 35,546 for
column (4). For ambient pollution, the number of observations for each pollutant based on 1997-2007 sample (20012007 sample for PM) is 3,124 (Ozone); 2,244 (CO); 4,172 (PM2.5); 546 (PM10); 2,684 (SO2); 1,782 (NO2). Asterisks
denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). For emissions, share of population covered is 100%. For ambient
pollution, share of population covered is 28-40 percent for ozone, CO, SO2, and NO2; 55 percent for PM2.5, and 10
percent for PM10.
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Table 3. Effect of the NBP Market on Log Medication Costs Per Capita
A. All Medications
1. All Medications

MarketScan as Share of Total Population
Counties as Share of Total Population
B. Specific Types of Medications
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular

3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular

County-by-Season FE
Summer-by-Year FE
State-by-Year FE
County-by-Year FE
Detailed Weather Controls
Only Counties With Ozone Monitors
Weighted by Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.008
(0.010)

-0.023
(0.020)

-0.015**
(0.006)

-0.016***
(0.006)

0.007
0.994

0.007
0.994

0.007
0.994

0.002
0.370

-0.009
(0.013)

-0.022
(0.023)

-0.021***
(0.008)

-0.017*
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.010)

-0.025
(0.020)

-0.014**
(0.006)

-0.017**
(0.008)

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

Notes: Medication costs are reported in 2015 dollars and deflated using the US CPI for urban consumers.
The entries in Table 3 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation (7)
when the dependent variable is the log of medication costs per person-season-year in a county. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and
county*season fixed effects. Additional control variables are listed in the bottom of Table 3. The reported
standard errors are clustered at the state-season level. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square
root of MarketScan population in a given county-year-season. The reported standard errors are clustered
at the state-season level Total population refers to the 2,539 counties in the main sample. Asterisks denote
p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Number of observations is as follows: Row 1 columns (1) to
(3): 30,926. Row 1 column (4): 2,338. Row 2 columns (1) to (3): 28,784. Row 2 column (4): 2,324. Row
3 columns (1) to (3): 24,080. Row 3 column (4): 2,296.
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Table 4. Effect of the NBP Emissions Market on Mortality Rates
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-2.15**
(0.94)

-2.09
(3.54)

-1.47*
(0.81)

-5.34***
(1.82)

-2.24
(1.46)

-0.75
(0.49)

-1.20
(1.79)

-0.47
(0.67)

-2.27*
(1.17)

-0.84
(1.03)

3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardio.

-1.40**
(0.57)

-0.89
(1.92)

-1.00**
(0.50)

-3.08***
(0.84)

-1.40*
(0.82)

4. External

0.57**
(0.23)

-0.02
(0.50)

0.32
(0.33)

0.28
(0.60)

0.37
(0.44)

-2.26
(3.90)
-39

-8.85
(7.30)
-152

-4.24
(6.14)
-73

3.63
(9.99)
63

-11.07
(9.73)
-191

-0.09
(0.32)
-105

-1.46
(1.07)
-1,701

-0.13
(0.47)
-151

-0.37
(1.14)
-431

-0.57
(0.84)
-664

-1.85
(4.96)
-165

-15.41
(11.79)
-1,373

-2.25
(6.16)
-200

-9.58
(10.43)
-853

-1.23
(6.11)
-110

-39.31***
(8.38)
-3,367

-40.32*
(20.51)
-3,572

-18.63*
(10.68)
-1,813

-90.91***
(23.00)
-7,912

-23.40
(17.93)
-2,507

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

A: All Deaths
1. All Deaths

B: Specific Causes of Death
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular

C. All Causes of Death, by Age Group
5. Age 0 (Infants)
Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths
6. Ages 1-64
Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths
7. Ages 65-74
Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths
8. Ages 75+
Estimated Change in 2005 Deaths
County-by-Season FE
Summer-by-Year FE
State-by-Year FE
County-by-Year FE
Detailed Weather Controls
Counties With Ozone Monitors
Data Begins in 2001

x

x

Notes: The entries in Table 4 are the coefficient estimates from the DDD estimator described in equation
(7) where the dependent variable is deaths per 100,000 population in each county-year-season. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression that includes a full set of county*year, season*year, and
county*season fixed effects. Additional control variables are listed in the bottom of Table 4. The reported
standard errors are clustered at the state-season level. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square
root of the relevant population in a given county-year-season. Unless noted otherwise, the data begins in
1997. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*),
<0.05 (**), <0.01 (***). Number of observations is 55,858 for columns (1) to (3); 3,124 for column (4);
and 35,546 for column (5).
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Table 5. Effect of NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Concentrations On Medication
Purchases and Mortality: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates,
2001-2007
Log Medication Costs
Counties
Ozone
with NOx
Monitored
All Counties Emissions
Counties
(1)
(2a)
(2b)
A: OLS
NOx Emissions

All-Cause Mortality
Counties
Ozone
with NOx
Monitored
All Counties Emissions
Counties
(3)
(4a)
(4b)

0.07
(1.13)

0.40
(1.09)

-----

-0.71*
(0.39)

-0.76*
(0.39)

-----

8-Hour Ozone

-----

-----

0.72
(1.00)

-----

-----

0.12
(0.22)

Days ≥65 ppb

-----

-----

0.22
(0.19)

-----

-----

0.01
(0.05)

21.20
(13.77)

12.01**
(5.78)

-----

5.16
(3.85)

5.35*
(2.99)

-----

8-Hour Ozone

-----

-----

6.23**
(2.33)

-----

-----

2.62**
(1.28)

Days ≥65 ppb

-----

-----

1.69**
(0.72)

-----

-----

0.86*
(0.49)

B: 2SLS
NOx Emissions

Notes: The coefficient estimates in columns (1), (2a), and (2b) are multiplied by 1000 for readability. All
estimates are based on the 2001-2007 sample. NOx emissions are measured in thousand tons per county.
All regressions include county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed effects, as well as the detailed
weather controls. The regressions are GLS weighted by the square root of the relevant population in a
given county-year-season (MarketScan or full population). In Panel B, the endogenous variable is NOx or
ozone and the excluded instrument is Summer*Post*NBP interaction (see equation 9). Number of
observations is 30,926 for medication regressions including all counties, 7,616 for medication regressions
including counties with NOx emissions, 2,338 for medication regressions including only counties with
ozone monitors, 35,546 for mortality regressions including all counties, 7,840 for mortality regressions
including counties with NOx emissions, and 2,352 for mortality regressions only including counties with
ozone monitors. The sample is smaller for medications than for mortality due to counties without no
medication data or zero expenditures. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Table 6. The Welfare Impacts of the NBP and the Social Benefits of NOx and Ozone Reductions
Medication
Costs
($ Million)
(1)

Medication
Copayments
($ Million)
(2)

-----

-----

-----

-----

$1,076
$4,843

$1,076
$4,843

$820
$3,690

$150
$676

2,238
10,069

$1,068
$4,807

$1,888
$8,497

$1,219
$5,483

C. The Annual Social Benefits of NOx Reductions in NBP states (Million Tons)
Regressions Based on . . .
All Counties
$1,086
$615
Counties with NOx Emissions

$211
$121

7,791
8,117

$3,720
$3,875

$4,806
$4,491

$3,931
$3,996

D. The Social Benefits of Ozone Reductions in NBP States (ppb)
1 ppb Ozone Decrease
1 Less Day With Ozone > 65 ppb

$47
$13

3,326
1,072

$1,588
$512

$1,907
$599

$1,635
$525

A. An Upper Bound Estimate of NBP's Social Costs
Upper Bound Per Year
Upper Bound, 2003-2007 Total
B. Estimates of the NBP's Benefits
Total Per Year
Total 2003-2007

$319
$87

Mortality:
Number of Monetized Value
Deaths
($ Million)
(3)
(4)

Total Using Total Using
(1)
(2)
($ Million) ($ Million)
(5)
(6)

Notes: All dollar amounts are in 2015 constant dollars deflated using BLS CPI for urban consumers. The mortality impact estimates without dollar
signs are number of deaths. The monetized mortality impact uses the VSL of $2.27 million (2015 dollars) from Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004)
and the age adjustments from Murphy and Topel (2006, p. 888). The implied VSLs are as follows: $2.26 million (infants); $1.78 million (age 164); $0.7 million (age 65-74); $0.3 million (age 75+). Total 2003-7 decrease due to NBP assumes impact is for half of 2003 summer and for all of
summers 2004-2007. NBP cost upper bound is based on the permit price of about $2,523/ton ($2015) and estimated total abatement quantity of
427,000 tons. The numbers in Panel A comes from multiplying together the mean NBP allowance price per ton, the effect of the NBP on countylevel NOx emissions (Table 2, column 4), and the number of counties in the NBP states (1,185). The numbers in Panels B-D come from
multiplying together regression estimates of how the NBP, NOx, or ozone affects medication costs or mortality by the total number of people in the
NBP states, averaged over 2003-2007 (136 million people). Specifically, Panel B, column (1), uses the estimate from Table 3, column (3). Panel
B, columns (2)-(3) use the estimates from Table 4, column (3), Panel C. Panel C, column (1) uses the estimate from Table 5, column (1), Panel B.
Panel C, columns (2)-(3) use the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column (3). Panel D, column (1) uses the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column
(2). Panel D, columns (2)-(3) use the estimate from Table 5, Panel B, column (4). Panel D estimates are based on regressions using counties with
ozone monitors. All estimates apply to the full population in NBP states. See the text for further details.
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Appendix I: The NOx Budget Trading Program and Particulate Matter
This appendix provides one explanation based in atmospheric chemistry as to why the NOx
Budget Trading Program might have limited effects on particulate matter. We begin by defining
the relevant compounds:
PM10 and PM2.5: particulate matter
NOx: nitrogen oxides
NO: nitric oxide, a component of NOx
NO2: nitrogen dioxide, a component of NOx
NH4NO3: ammonium nitrate, the component of PM2.5 and PM10 which NOx can form
NO3: nitrate, a derivative of NOx
NH4: ammonium
SO4: sulfate, formed as a byproduct of electricity generation
NH4e: excess ammonium, i.e., ammonium which remains after NH4 has bonded with SO4
NH3: ammonia
HNO3: nitric acid, a derivative of NOx
A summary is that excess ammonium (NH4e) is the necessary ingredient for nitrate (NO3) to
become ammonium nitrate (NH4NO3), which is a component of particulates. In the absence of
NH4e, NOx and NO3 do not form particulate matter. NH4e levels were low in the Eastern U.S.
during the operation of the NOx Budget Trading Program because levels of sulfate (SO4) were
high enough to absorb much of the available NH4, so that little sulfate remained to bond with
nitrate.
A more detailed explanation follows. For NOx to become a component of PM10 or PM2.5, NOx
must decompose to nitrate (NO3). Nitrate then must undergo a reaction with excess ammonium
(NH4e) to form ammonium nitrate (NH4NO3). Ammonium nitrate is a component of particulate
matter but nitrate is not. So a necessary condition for NOx to increase particulate matter is the
presence of sufficient excess ammonium to convert nitrate into ammonium nitrate.
To assess the empirical relevance of this explanation, we calibrated an air quality model
(CRDM) using the 2002 National Emissions Inventory, as in Muller and Mendelsohn (2012).
According to calculations from CRDM, the Eastern U.S. had relatively low levels of NH4e during
the operation of the NOx Budget Trading Program. Excess ammonium levels were low in part
because NH4 preferentially bonds with SO4, which is a byproduct of sulfur emissions. Even with
the Acid Rain program, sulfur levels were high enough in the Eastern U.S. in 2003-2007 that
little NH4 remained as NH4e after the NH4-SO4 reaction occurred.
According to calculations using CRDM, in the period 2003-2007, the Eastern U.S. had relatively
low levels of excess ammonium, which could explain why we fail to find consistent evidence
consistently that the NOx Budget Program affected particulate levels. Pandis and Seinfeld (2006),
a widely-cited atmospheric chemistry text, note that this phenomenon is well-established:
“The formation of ammonium nitrate is often limited by the availability of one of the
reactants. Figure 10.24 shows the ammonium concentration as a function of the total
2

available ammonia and the total available nitric acid for a polluted area. The upper left
part of the figure (area A) is characterized by relatively high total nitric acid
concentrations and relatively low ammonia. Large urban areas are often in this regime.
The isopleths are almost parallel to the y-axis in this area, so decreases in nitric acid
availability do not affect significantly the NH4NO3 concentration in this area.” (p. 483)
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Appendix II: Medications as Defensive Investments
It is worth considering the extent to which medication purchases studied in this paper should be
defined as defensive, rather than just another health expenditure. We argue that whether the
drugs are taken before or after health conditions manifest themselves, the important issue is that
drugs aim to mitigate a negative health condition in both instances. Indeed, a recent New
England Journal of Medicine article underscores that the key to treating asthma is limiting
exposure to ambient concentrations of air pollution and consumption of pharmaceuticals:
Achieving good long-term control of asthma (infrequent asthmatic symptoms, an
unrestricted level of activity, normal or near-normal lung function, and rare
asthmatic attacks requiring emergency care) requires a multifaceted approach:
avoidance of environmental stimuli that can provoke bronchoconstriction and acute
and chronic airway inflammation . . . and [emphasis added] drug therapy (Fanta
2009, p. 1005).
Further there has been a substantial decline in asthma mortality and emergency department visits
since the 1970s and 1980s, even as the incidence of asthma increased; a leading explanation is
the more widespread use of asthma medications, specifically inhaled corticosteroids (Fanta
2009). The point is that these drugs reduce the incidence of negative health outcomes and that
the failure to account for expenditures on them in the previous literature has led to downward
biased measures of willingness to pay for ozone reductions.
Additionally, we believe the theoretical economics literature supports the interpretation of the
medication results. Specifically in the canonical model of health production function (see e.g.,
the recent JEL review by Graff-Zivin and Neidell 2013), individual compensatory responses to
ambient pollution levels are typically decomposed into averting activities (aimed at reducing the
amount of ingested pollution) and mitigating activities (aimed at reducing the negative effect of
ingested pollution), with the latter including healthcare costs and medication purchases. In this
framework, it is clear from the model structure that medication purchases are a defensive
measure, not an outcome.
While these arguments suggest that all medications are defensive, we do provide one estimate
which distinguishes respiratory medications (which are taken after respiratory symptoms appear)
from long-term control medications, which are taken regularly in order to prevent the appearance
of symptoms. Using National Drug Codes, we attempted to distinguish “maintenance”
respiratory medications that are taken every day or week to treat chronic respiratory conditions,
from “rescue” respiratory medications that are taken once acute respiratory symptoms appear.
We distinguish these medications using lists from Fanta (2009) of which respiratory medications
are short-acting (i.e., rescue) versus long-acting (i.e., control). We also list a set of results which
restricts regressions to mail-order purchases, since these are more likely to be focused on longterm control medications. We find evidence that the NBP decreased purchases of both shortacting and long-term control medications (Appendix Table 2). The point estimates for the overall
sample indicate that the NBP decreased purchase of short-acting medications by 2.4 percentage
points and decreased purchase of long-term control medications by 2.1 percentage points; only
the long-term control estimate is statistically significant. The estimated coefficients are slightly
4

larger though less precise in the subset of counties with ozone monitors. Our estimates for mailorder purchases are similar to the overall estimates of NBP decreasing expenditure by about 1.5
percentage points.
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Appendix III: Data and Methodology Details
This appendix provides additional information on the study sample construction and the
definitions of the main variables.
Population Denominator
The main medication variable is the log of medication purchases per person. Because not all
persons purchase medications, we count the number of individuals eligible to purchase
medications from the enrollment files. We only count individuals who have a variable indicating
that they recorded drug purchases, though this covers essentially all individuals in the firms and
years we study. When the enrollment file has a missing value for an individual’s county, we fill
it with the county which is reported for that available in the nearest available lag; or if no lagged
months have a reported county, then we fill it with the closest-available lead. We use the first
month of a season to count the population in that season.
Medication Purchases
The MarketScan data report the purchase county, date, the medication’s National Drug Code
(NDC), and the money paid from consumer and insurer to the medication provider. 2007 is the
last year of the MarketScan dataset available for this analysis, so that is the last year of data for
the analysis. Reported medication payments vary substantially across individuals and include
some negative values. To address measurement error in medication payments, we measure the
mean medication payment for each National Drug Code. This calculation uses all positive
recorded medication payments for observations in the main regression sample. The dependent
variable in main regressions is the log of this mean price. We deflate all currency to real year
2015 values using the BLS CPI for urban consumers. Medication purchases are assigned to the
county where they are recorded. We include only medication purchases from individuals
recorded in the enrollment files as working for one of the firms in the sample. While the main
analysis includes individuals in a balanced panel of 19 firms, sensitivity analyses in Appendix
Tables 2 and 4 report estimates from a balanced panel of about 600,000 persons in these firms.
For confidentiality reasons MarketScan does not identify the 19 firms. These tables also report a
sensitivity analysis using the 11 firms which appear in all the years 2000-2007.
It is worth noting that the medication expenditure estimates reported in Table 6 potentially suffer
from re-transformation bias since the regression models are log-linear in expenditures, but Table
6 reports untransformed expenditures. When we apply the “smearing” estimator of Duan (1983)
that corrects for re-transformation bias we obtain essentially the same estimates as the unadjusted
ones in Table 6.
As discussed in the main text, the medication estimates are representative of Americans
employed in large firms and their dependents, who appear in the MarketScan data; these people
may have better baseline health than the average American, but may also have better health
insurance and hence spend more on medications than the average American. Appendix Table 6
compares the characteristics of individuals in the MarketScan database with individuals in the
January 2003 Current Population Survey (CPS) and the year 2000 Census. Compared to CPS
respondents, MarketScan workers are about 11 percentage points more likely to be in a union, 7
6

percentage points more likely to receive a salary (rather than working for hourly wages), and 5
percentage points more likely to be full-time (rather than part-time). Heavy industry sectors are
heavily over-represented in MarketScan, relative to workers in the CPS, while the retail, finance,
insurance, real estate, and services are substantially under-represented in MarketScan. The age
distribution of MarketScan individuals is similar to the overall age distribution in the year 2000
census, except MarketScan excludes individuals aged 65 and older. 1
Hospitalizations
As mentioned in the main text, we classify hospitalizations according to the mode procedure for
each visit. MarketScan codes the primary diagnosis for each service provided in a hospitalization
episode. Patients admitted to the hospital typically receive numerous services, some of which
may have distinct diagnosis codes.
Weather
We compiled weather data from records of the National Climate Data Center Summary of the
Day files (File TD-3200). The key control variables for our analysis are the daily maximum and
minimum temperature, total daily precipitation, and dew point temperature. In order to ensure
accurate weather readings, and complete county-day data files, we construct our weather
variables for a given year from the readings of all weather stations that report valid readings for
every day in that year. The acceptable station-level data is then aggregated at the county level by
taking an inverse-distance weighted average of all the valid measurements from stations that are
located within a 200 km radius of each county’s centroid, where the weights are the inverse of
their squared distance to the centroid so that more distant stations are given less weight. This
results in complete weather by county-day files that we can link with the other files in our
analysis.
Dew point temperature values are limited in the raw data. To address missing values, we impute
them by regressing observed county-day dew point temperature on mean temperature, mean
precipitation, year fixed effects, county fixed effects, a quartic polynomial in day-of-year, and
interactions of the quartic polynomial separately with each of the following three variables: daily
mean precipitation, daily mean temperature and precipitation*temperature. The regression uses
1997-2007 data. We replace missing dew point temperature values with these imputed values.
Pollution
We assign each ton of emitted pollution to the county where the emitting source is located.
Counties with no recorded emissions are assigned emissions of zero. We use this approach
because we observe all NBP-regulated pollution emissions and the information on their emitting
source, so we record them as such without any kind of spatial averaging needed.

1

Given the large sample sizes and differences in means, hypothesis tests reject equality of these characteristics
between MarketScan and the other data sources at 99% significance level.
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We convert pollution units using values from Spellman and Whiting (2005). For each pollutant,
we calculate ambient levels in each monitor-day, then the unweighted average across monitors in
each county-day, and finally aggregate up to county-season. All ambient pollution regressions
are GLS based on the square root of the total number of underlying pollution readings.
The abrupt beginning and end of the market on May 1 and October 1 makes a daily regression
discontinuity estimator seem appealing. However, because ozone in the Eastern US mainly
reaches high levels in July and August, the market is likely to have small effects on ambient
pollution on April 30 or October 1. Although emitted pollution changed sharply around these
dates (Figure 1), we detect no change in mean daily ambient pollution in small windows around
these dates.
We did explore statistical models that separately estimate effects of the market on pollution (and
health) outcomes in each month of summer. These specifications did not have statistical power to
distinguish effects in different months of summer, and hence we focus on results that treat
summer as homogenous. Modeling the market’s impact on summer overall, rather than monthby-month, also produces medium-term estimates of the market’s impact. This makes the results
less susceptible to the concern that changes in air quality cause short-term displacement of
mortality or medication purchases without changing their medium- or long-run values.
Econometric Approach
The instrumental variables estimates including all counties are computationally demanding given
the three sets of fixed effects (county*year, county*season, season*year) and approximately
2,500 counties in the data. We implement these estimators using efficient optimization routines
(Guimaraes and Portugal 2010). In smaller samples, these routines obtain numerically equivalent
point estimates to those of conventional methods. The estimated confidence regions may be
slightly conservative, since in these smaller samples they obtain standards errors that are a few
percent larger than those estimated with conventional methods.
The fact that our counterfactual allows other changes such as NOx regulations to be operating in
the background can be seen from Appendix Figure 2. In both seasons and regions of the country,
NOx emissions were declining even before the NBP began, and for 2000-2002 the pre-trends
were similar in both regions and seasons. The counterfactual analyzed here is if summertime
NOx emissions in the Eastern U.S. continued along the pre-trends observed before 2002, but did
not experience the large 2002-2004 decline which the NBP generated.
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Appendix IV: Additional Details about the NOx Budget Trading Program
This Appendix describes additional details about the NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP) not
explained in the main text.
Our research design is based on comparing emissions in summer versus winter months. Because
NOx abatement technologies have substantial operating costs (Fowlie 2010), units begin
operating them around May 1 and stop around September 30. Part of the operating cost comes
from the “heat rate penalty” of selective catalytic reduction—the fact that they require a small
amount of electricity to operate.
The NBP grew out of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), an organization of Northeast
States formed in the 1990s. OTC studies found that ozone levels the Northeast U.S. had high
ozone partly because prevailing winds transported NOx from the industrial Midwest to the
Northeast, where it produced ozone in the Northeast (OTC 1998). The OTC led to a version of
the NBP that operated in 1999-2002 and produced small declines in summer NOx emissions. 2
The OTC then created a more stringent version of the NBP which began in 2003 and operated
until 2008. 3
As described in the main text, the NBP included 19 states plus DC. Georgia was initially slated
to enter the market in 2007 but the EPA eventually chose to exclude Georgia.
Policymakers included some provisions to help smooth the start of the market. Regulators
provided an additional set of initial allowances in 2003-2004 known as the Compliance
Supplement Pool or CSP to help states begin compliance with the market without threatening
electricity supply reliability. Ultimately many of these allowances were banked to future years.
Unused allowances from the NBP could be transferred to the CAIR ozone season program which
succeeded the NBP after 2008.
In 2002, summertime emissions from sources participating in this market totaled approximately
1 million tons, with a significant downward pre-trend that had similar magnitude in both the East
and West (Appendix Figure 2). Compared to the level of NOx emissions in 2002, the final cap of
550,000 tons would have decreased emissions by 45%. As discussion of our results later in the
paper shows, however, accounting for the pre-trend and the fact that emitters banked allowances
2

This market also goes under the name NOx SIP Call. This smaller market also operated in May-September. The
OTC market aimed to decrease summer NOx emissions by 76,000 tons (OTC 2003). NOx emissions from regulated
NBP units in our data fell by 504,000 tons between 2002 and 2005, or about 6.6 times more than the OTC market.
While in principle this earlier market could be a source of confounding variation for the pollution and mortality
regressions which begin in 1997, those regressions have similar signs and significance as the pollution and mortality
regressions beginning in 2001. The OTC market cap for most states did not change between 2000 and 2002, so this
is not a potential source of confounding variation for our pre-period in those years. The only small change in the
OTC market in these years is that some pollution sources in Maryland and DC entered the market in those years, and
the cap in those states modestly increased to accommodate them (OTC 2003).
3
2007 is the last year of the MarketScan dataset available for this analysis, so that is the last year of data for the
analysis. In 2009, the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) replaced this market. In 2010, the EPA proposed a Transport
Rule which would combine this NOx market with a market for SO2 emissions. In July 2011, the EPA replaced this
proposal with the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, which regulates power plant emissions in 27 states with the goal of
decreasing ambient ozone and particulate levels.
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across years shows that the causal impact of the market was to decrease emissions by only 35-39
percent.
One important question involves the geographic scope of the NBP’s effects, and of our analysis.
As discussed in the main text, the main analysis excludes states adjacent to the NBP region from
the main results because their treatment status is ambiguous, though sensitivity analyses consider
alternatives. The main analysis excludes Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Georgia, Mississippi,
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. We do not exclude Arkansas or Florida because they
share only small sections of border with the NBP area and because prevailing winds blow to the
Northeast, away from these states. We exclude Maine even though it does not share a border
with the NBP region because it is downwind and close to many NBP states. We define Alabama
as an NBP state even though the southern region of the state did not participate in the market.
These exclusions have a basis in prevailing wind patterns and directions. On the 96 percent of
days in the NBP region where windspeeds are below 6 meters per second, ozone and its
precursors travel less than 300 miles (Husar and Renard 1997). This implies that on many days,
emissions from the NBP region affect the states we exclude, but do not affect the states we
include in the comparison group. Husar and Renard (1997) find that ozone and precursors travel
up to 120 miles on days with windspeeds below 3 m/s and up to 300 miles on days with
windspeeds below 6 m/s. We obtained raw windspeed readings from the National Climate Data
Center’s Summary of the Day – First Order (DSI-3210) files and measured average windspeed
and directions across states for all states in the NBP region. Mean windspeeds are below 3 m/s
on 61 percent of days and are 3-6 m/s on 34 percent of days. Although prevailing winds blow to
the East, on many days wind blows in other directions. On 27 percent of days wind primarily
blows to the north, on 35 percent of days it primarily blows to the East, on 21 percent to the
South, and on 17 percent to the West.
Another interesting question is the extent to which any changes in NOx or other pollution
emissions occurred due to fuel conversion of units, for example from coal to natural gas. This is
ambiguous from participation data available from the EPA’s Air Markets Program Data, though
the data do rule out large-scale closure of coal units. The number of coal units in the NBP
actually grew from 845 in 2003 to 856 in 2008. At the same time, the number of gas units grew
from 1,168 to 1,305 and the number of oil units fell from 471 to 463. So the absolute number of
coal units rose, while the proportion of NBP units that are coal fell by 1.5 percentage points.
Qualitatively similar patterns occur within the subset of NBP units that are owned by electric
utilities, and within the subset that are industrial boilers. These statistics ignore the 1% of units
that report multiple primary fuels.
We also explored whether the NOx reductions produced any counterproductive outcomes, with
mixed results. When an area has low concentrations of volatile organic compounds relative to
NOx, then decreasing NOx can increase ozone levels. First, we identify a list of such “VOCconstrained” cities from Blanchard (2001). Second, we define a county as VOC-constrained if its
mean ratio of weekend/weekday ozone exceeds 1.05. The former approach finds that the change
in ozone concentrations is similar in VOC-constrained and -unconstrained regions. The latter
indicates that in VOC-constrained regions of the NBP, the decline in ozone was smaller than in
the unconstrained areas. See rows 10 and 11 of Appendix Table 1.
10

While Figure 2 (A) shows the regression-adjusted event study graph of NOx emissions,
Appendix Figure 2 shows the raw emissions trends separately by season and year. Appendix
Figure 2 (A) shows that the NBP led to sharp and discontinuous reductions in summer emissions
in the Eastern U.S., starting in 2003 when the market began in 8 Northeastern states and
Washington, DC. Emissions declined another 15-20 percent starting in May 2004, when the
market added 11 more Eastern states. Winter emissions in the Eastern U.S. continued their
gradual downward pre-2003 trend. In contrast, Appendix Figure 2 (B) reveals that summer and
winter NOx emissions in the non-NBP states evolved smoothly over time, with similar downward
trends and no evidence of any discernible trend change in 2003 and 2004, when the NBP was
implemented. In short, this Appendix Figure shows that NOx emissions declined in exactly the
areas, months, and years that the market design would predict.
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Appendix V: Additional Sensitivity Analyses
All of the ambient and emitted pollution results are further evaluated and probed in Appendix
Table 1, which considers a wide range of specifications, including changes in the method used to
compute the standard errors and alternative sample selection rules. In addition, we estimated
models that also allowed for differential pre-existing trends in the NBP states during the summer.
In general, the models fail to reject the null of no difference in pre-existing trends and cause the
standard error on the parameter of interest, γ1, to increase by a factor of 2 to 3. The only
substantive change is that the impact on ozone concentrations is larger in magnitude although the
95% confidence intervals of the estimates from specifications with and without the differential
trends overlap.
Appendix Table 2 reports medication results from a series of robustness checks, none of which
alter the qualitative conclusions from Table 3. For example, Row 12 shows that defining the
dependent variable as the log of copayments per person rather than as the log of mean
medication costs per person results in a decrease in medication costs per person of 1.4 percent, as
opposed to the 1.5 percent effect in the main sample. Estimates for the subsample of young
children are very imprecise due in part to the smaller sample of children.
Row 2 considers the non-NBP states excluded from the main analysis sample since they border
NBP states and are expected to benefit to due wind transmission of pollution. This group
includes Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Georgia, Mississippi, Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont. Our results are similar when we reassign these states to the NBP.
Appendix Table 4 discusses similar sensitivity analyses for the effect of the NBP on mortality.
The qualitative conclusions are similar under these alternative estimates.
Appendix Table 5, column (1) explores heterogeneity in the magnitude of the NBP’s effect on
ambient ozone across different sub-parts of the NBP. Ten northeastern states entered the NBP
market in 2003 whereas other states began in 2004 (the delay was due to litigation). Also
because prevailing winds blow to the Northeast, they might experience larger effects of
emissions decreases in the industrial Midwest. The NBP decreased ozone in these states by an
additional 2 ppb, decreased medication expenditures in these states by an additional 3.8
percentage points. The NBP caused a larger decline in ozone for the ten northeastern states
which entered the market in 2003, which is unsurprising since these states entered the market a
year earlier than other states did and since prevailing winds blow to the northeast. The NBP also
caused a larger decline in ozone for counties which had relatively high ozone in 2002, which fits
with the finding of Figure 2 (B) that most of the decline was from days with the highest ozone
levels.
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Appendix VI: Supplementary Figures and Tables
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Appendix Figure 1. Participation in NBP by State

Notes: Dark blue states are participating in NBP during the 2003-2007 period (referred as ‘NBP states’ in
the text). Light blue states are not participating (non-NBP states). Shaded states are excluded from the
main analysis sample.
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Appendix Figure 2. Summer-Equivalent Seasonal NOx Emissions (Mil. Tons)
(A) States Participating in NBP
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Notes: The data underlying Appendix Figure 2 is expressed as summer-equivalent since the
summer period has 5 months while the winter period has 7 months. Specifically, the summer
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equivalent of winter emissions is actual winter emissions multiplied by 5/7. These graphs show
summary statistics describing total emissions, not regression results. Summer defined as MaySeptember, winter as January-April and October-December. NBP participating states include:
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. States
not participating in NBP include: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Kansas, Lousiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Wisconsin are excluded from the main analysis sample.
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Appendix Figure 3. NBP Market Impact on Ambient Ozone Pollution, Detail
(A) Number of Summer Days in 6 Ozone Bins, NBP Participating States, 2001-2002
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(C) Event Study for Daily Ozone 8-Hour Values, 1997-2007
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Notes: Ozone 8-hour value is measured as the maximum rolling 8-hour mean of hourly values within in
each day, which is the statistic used in EPA nonattainment designations. Panel A shows the average
number of summer days (out of a possible 153 days) in 6 bins for daily ozone 8-hour value in the NBP
states in 2001-2002 (pre-NBP period). Panel B shows the estimated impact of NBP on the number of
summer days in 4 of these categories for daily ozone 8-hour value. Panel C shows the coefficients from
an event study regression for ozone 8-hour values where the estimates for year 2002 are restricted to have
a value of 0. All regressions include detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year,
and county*season fixed effects, and are weighted by the number of ozone monitors in each county. The
standard errors underlying the 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season
level.
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Appendix Figure 4. Event Study Graphs for All Outcomes
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Notes: Appendix Figure 4 reports the coefficients from event study regressions for all outcomes
where the estimates for year 2002 are restricted to have a value of 0. All regressions include
detailed weather controls and a full set of county*year, season*year, and county*season fixed
effects, and are weighted by the relavant variable for a specific outcome (number of ozone
monitors in each county, population in each county). The standard errors underlying the 95%
confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season level. See Appendix Figure 1
notes or text for NBP participation status designation. The standard errors underlying the 95%
confidence intervals (dashed lines) are clustered at the state-season level.
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Appendix Table 1. Sensitivity Analysis: Emitted and Ambient Pollution
Emitted Pollution
CO2
SO 2
NOx

Ozone

Air Quality (Ambient Pollution)
Ozone Days
CO
PM10
PM2.5

SO 2

NO2

≥65ppm
1. Baseline Sample
State-Season Clusters
County Clusters
State Clusters
State-Year Clusters
County-Season Clusters
Firm-County Clusters

(1)
-0.33***
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.07)

(2)
-0.07**
(0.03)
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.05)

(3)
-12.43*
(6.59)
(7.76)
(9.38)
(6.63)
(5.49)
(7.96)

(4)
-3.06***
(0.50)
(0.52)
(0.70)
(1.13)
(0.37)
(0.53)

(5)
-8.95***
(2.61)
(2.44)
(3.68)
(3.62)
(1.74)
(2.33)

(6)
-0.02
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)

(7)
-0.31
(0.31)
(0.31)
(0.43)
(0.48)
(0.22)
(0.29)

(8)
-1.18
(0.87)
(1.16)
(1.24)
(1.44)
(0.83)
(1.17)

(9)
0.13
(0.18)
(0.24)
(0.25)
(0.18)
(0.17)
(0.23)

(10)
-0.92**
(0.35)
(0.46)
(0.49)
(0.38)
(0.33)
(0.42)

2. Counties With Ozone
Monitors

-0.22**
(0.10)

-0.25
(0.21)

-61.55
(43.28)

-3.06***
(0.50)

-8.95***
(2.61)

-0.01
(0.03)

-0.29
(0.38)

-3.43
(4.56)

0.16
(0.24)

-0.98*
(0.55)

3. Non-NBP Border States
Assigned to NBP

-0.25***
(0.06)

-0.05
(0.03)

-10.34*
(5.83)

-3.03***
(0.49)

-8.90***
(2.56)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.34
(0.29)

-0.40
(0.93)

0.11
(0.18)

-0.77**
(0.36)

4. Limit to Most Comparable
Non-NBP States

-0.32***
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.03)

-6.55
(7.27)

-2.97***
(0.53)

-9.91***
(2.89)

-0.03
(0.02)

-0.45
(0.31)

-1.73
(1.23)

0.14
(0.24)

-1.08***
(0.34)

5. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003

-0.32***
(0.06)

-0.09***
(0.03)

-16.00**
(6.67)

-3.65***
(0.65)

-10.70***
(2.66)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.52
(0.37)

-1.30
(0.93)

0.01
(0.16)

-0.96**
(0.36)

6. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003

-0.27***
(0.06)

-0.04
(0.03)

-6.56
(5.35)

-1.98***
(0.40)

-5.77***
(2.14)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.09
(0.24)

-0.84
(0.77)

0.20
(0.16)

-0.71**
(0.29)

7. Drop Year 2003

-0.35***
(0.07)

-0.08**
(0.03)

-14.46**
(6.79)

-3.86***
(0.61)

-12.02***
(2.83)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.51
(0.35)

-0.69
(0.90)

0.05
(0.19)

-1.05***
(0.37)

8. Diff-in-Diff for NBP States

-0.32***
(0.06)

-0.07*
(0.04)

-4.26
(3.87)

-4.72***
(0.43)

-11.04***
(1.99)

0.04**
(0.02)

0.43*
(0.24)

-1.88**
(0.87)

0.04
(0.12)

-1.23**
(0.50)

9. Monitors Operating
≥ 30 Weeks

-----

-----

-----

-3.04***
(0.42)

-11.72***
(1.89)

-0.02
(0.02)

-0.46
(0.29)

-0.43
(0.97)

0.11
(0.17)

-0.62
(0.37)

10. Main Effect

---------

---------

---------

-2.85**
(1.22)
0.19
(1.25)

-12.21**
(4.27)
1.44
(4.80)

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

-3.52***
(0.57)
1.29**
(0.51)

-11.60***
(2.83)
7.21***
(2.29)

---------

---------

---------

---------

---------

Summer*Post*NBP *VOCConstrained
11. Main Effect
Summer*Post*NBP*
(High Weekend O 3)

Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 1 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable
from separate DDD regressions (unless noted otherwise). The reported standard errors are clustered at the
state-season level (unless noted otherwise). The regressions use the specification and sample of Table 2
column (4) (unless otherwise noted). The entries after row 1 present different levels of clustering for
standard errors. Row 3 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine,
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row
4 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita,
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. "Monitors Operating ≥ 30 weeks" uses a
monitor selection rule which requires each monitor to have valid readings in 30 weeks of each year in the
data, rather than the 47-week rule used in the main results. "Summer*Post*NBP*VOC-Constrained"
reports the interaction of the main triple-difference term with an MSA indicator for being VOC
constrained based on Blanchard (2001). "Summer*Post*NBP*(High Weekend O3)” interacts the main
triple-difference term with an indicator for whether the weekend/weekday ozone ratio of a county exceeds
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1.05. This provides an alternative indicator of VOC-constrained regions. Regressions use 2001-2007 data.
Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis: Medications

1. Baseline Sample
State-Season Clusters
County Clusters
State Clusters
State-Year Clusters
County-Season Clusters
Firm-County Clusters

All
(1)
-0.015**
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.006)

Respiratory or
Cardiovascular
(2)
-0.021***
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.007)

Non-Respiratory and
Non-Cardiovascular
(3)
-0.014**
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.007)

2. Non-NBP Border States Assigned to
NBP

-0.016***
(0.005)

-0.021***
(0.007)

-0.015***
(0.005)

3. Limit to Most Comparable Non-NBP
States

-0.014*
(0.008)

-0.016*
(0.009)

-0.013
(0.008)

4. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003

-0.010
(0.006)

-0.015*
(0.008)

-0.008
(0.007)

5. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003

-0.016***
(0.005)

-0.021***
(0.006)

-0.016***
(0.005)

-0.012*
(0.006)

-0.019**
(0.008)

-0.011*
(0.006)

-0.014**
(0.006)

-0.020**
(0.008)

-0.012**
(0.006)

8. Ages 0-17

0.005
(0.013)

0.001
(0.020)

0.004
(0.013)

9. Panel of People

-0.009
(0.008)

-0.018**
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.008)

-10.640***
(2.445)

-2.991***
(0.950)

-8.149***
(2.187)

11. Purchase-Specific Costs

-0.013**
(0.006)

-0.020***
(0.007)

-0.011*
(0.006)

12. Copay

-0.014**
(0.006)

-0.022***
(0.008)

-0.012*
(0.006)

6. Drop Year 2003

7. Log Medications (Not Costs)

10. Levels (Not Logs)
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Appendix Table 2. Sensitivity Analysis: Medications (ctd)
All
(1)
-0.009
(0.006)

Respiratory or
Cardiovascular
(2)
-0.017**
(0.008)

Non-Respiratory and
Non-Cardiovascular
(3)
-0.008
(0.007)

14. Mail Order

-0.015**
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.007)

15. Only Counties with Ozone Monitors

-0.016***
(0.006)

-0.017*
(0.010)

-0.017**
(0.008)

16. Respiratory: Short-Acting Only

-----

-0.025
(0.018)

-----

17. Respiratory: Long-Term Only

-----

-0.020**
(0.008)

-----

13. 2000-2007 Firm Panel

Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 2 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable
from separate DDD regressions using data for 2001-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at
the state-season level. Row 2 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine,
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row
3 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita,
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. “Log Medications (not costs)” uses
counts of medication purchases, rather than cost measures. "Panel of People" uses the much smaller panel
of persons who appear in all observations of the MarketScan sample. "Levels (Not Logs)" specifies the
response variable in levels rather than logs. "Purchase-Specific Costs" uses the raw reported prices, rather
than averaging across national drug codes to deal with outliers as in the main analysis. "Counties with
Ozone Data" restricts the analysis to include only counties with ozone monitors satisfying the monitor
selection rule. "Copay" measures costs as purchase-level patient expenditures. Asterisks denote p-value <
0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Appendix Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis: Hospitalization Costs
A: All Hospitalizations
1. All Hospitalizations

B: Specific Groups of Hospitalizations
2. Respiratory or Cardiovascular

3. Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular

County-by-Season FE
Summer-by-Year FE
State-by-Year FE
County-by-Year FE
Detailed Weather Controls
Only Counties With Ozone Monitors
Weighted by Population

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-5.91
(19.60)

-4.17
(22.34)

-7.43
(23.12)

-79.12***
(28.01)

-9.26
(5.59)

-9.13
(6.77)

-10.22
(6.69)

-44.95***
(13.30)

3.36
(15.98)

4.96
(17.17)

2.79
(18.90)

-34.17
(20.44)

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

x

Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 3 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable
from separate DDD regressions using data for 2001-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at
the state-season level. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Appendix Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis: Mortality
All
(1)
-1.47*
(0.81)
(1.19)
(1.16)
(1.70)
(0.84)

Respiratory or
Cardiovascular
(2)
-0.47
(0.67)
(0.79)
(0.96)
(1.13)
(0.56)

Non-Respiratory and
Non-Cardiovascular
(3)
-1.00**
(0.50)
(0.78)
(0.71)
(0.88)
(0.55)

2. Non-NBP Border States Assigned to NBP

-0.73
(0.83)

-0.25
(0.65)

-0.48
(0.50)

3. Limit to Most Comparable Non-NBP
States

-0.34
(0.83)

-0.06
(0.72)

-0.28
(0.47)

4. Post = 1.0 in Year 2003

-0.93
(0.79)

0.13
(0.65)

-1.06**
(0.49)

5. Post = 0.0 in Year 2003

-1.78**
(0.79)

-1.00
(0.63)

-0.78*
(0.46)

-1.64*
(0.84)

-0.61
(0.67)

-1.02*
(0.53)

7. Logs (Not Levels)

-0.01**
(0.00)

-0.01**
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

8. Age-Adjustment

-1.45
(0.89)

-0.71
(0.69)

-0.74
(0.54)

-5.34***
(1.82)

-2.27*
(1.17)

-3.08***
(0.84)

1. Baseline Sample
State-Season Clusters
County Clusters
State Clusters
State-Year Clusters
County-Season Clusters

6. Drop Year 2003

9. Only Counties With Ozone Monitors

Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 4 are the coefficient estimates on the Summer*Post*NBP variable
from separate DDD regressions using data for 1997-2007. The reported standard errors are clustered at
the state-season level. Row 2 takes eight non-NBP states that border the NBP area (Iowa, Georgia, Maine,
Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and assigns them to the NBP area. Row
3 limits non-NBP states to the half with ozone data which have the smallest Euclidean distance from NBP
states, defined from year 2002 mean ozone, NOx emissions per square mile, medication costs per capita,
and temperature. The non-NBP comparison states selected by this criterion are: Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. "Logs (Not Levels)" specifies the
response variable in logs rather than levels. Age-adjustment modifies the response variable to use ageadjusted mortality counts, rather than total deaths per population. Regressions use 1997-2007 data.
Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Appendix Table 5. Heterogeneity Within NBP Region in NBP Effects
8-Hour Ozone
(1)
Interaction of NBP*Post*Summer with Dummy for …
1. Ten Northeastern States
-2.648***
(0.794)

All Medication
Expenditures
(2)

All Mortality
(3)

-0.038***
(0.014)

-1.118
(2.273)

2. County has Below-Median
Weekend/Weekday Ozone Ratio
in Summer 2002 (VOC-Constrained)

-0.364
(0.904)

0.015
(0.009)

4.793
(4.373)

3. County has Above-Median
Post-2003 Mean Summer
Temperature

2.630**
(1.135)

-0.005
(0.006)

-0.655
(1.633)

4. State has Above-Median
Child Asthma Rate

-1.104
(1.067)

0.029***
(0.010)

2.765
(3.334)

5. State has Above-Median
Adult+Child Asthma Rate

-1.109
(1.167)

-0.013
(0.012)

-0.474
(3.274)

6. County's has Above-Median
2002 Medication Expenditure
or Mortality Per Capita

-0.975
(0.792)

-0.006
(0.009)

-1.601
(4.445)

-----

-0.043
(0.043)

-1.120
(3.361)

-3.098***
(0.488)

-0.004
(0.012)

-7.047*
(4.078)

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

7. County has Above-Median
2002 Respir.+Cardio. Medication
Expenditure or Mortality per Capita
8. County has Above-Median
Number of Ozone Days ≥60ppb
in Summer 2002

County-by-Season FE
Summer-by-Year FE
County-by-Year FE
Detailed Weather Controls
Data Begin in 2001
Weighted by Population

Notes: The entries in Appendix Table 4 are the coefficient estimates on Summer*Post*NBP*X, where X
is the interaction term specified in each row of the table. The reported standard errors are clustered at the
state-season level. The regression also controls for Summer*Post*NBP (coefficient not shown), for
detailed weather controls, and for county-by-season, county-by-year, and season-by-year fixed effects.
Row 1 interacts the main effect with an indicator for being in one of the ten Northeastern states where
NBP began in 2003 rather than 2004. Row 3 interacts the main effect with a dummy for a summer having
above-median post-2002 season-mean temperature, where the median is calculated separately for each
27

county. Rows 4 and 5 interact the main effect with dummies for a state having above-median 2002 asthma
rates. Rows 6 and 7 interact the main effect with a dummy for a county having above-median summer
2002 medication expenditures or mortality. All data include years 2001-2007. Asterisks denote p-value <
0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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Appendix Table 6. Characteristics of the MarketScan Sample

Employee Classification
Union
Non-Union
Salary
Hourly
Employment Status
Active Full-Time Employee
Active Part-Time Employee
Relation of Patient to Employee
Employee
Spouse
Child/Other
Industry
Oil & Gas Extraction, Mining
Manufacturing, Durable Goods
Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods
Transportation, Communications, Utilities
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
Services
Sex
Male
Female
Age
0-4 Years
5-17 Years
18-64 Years
≥65 Years

MarketScan
(1)

CPS Jan 2003
(2)

Census 2000
(3)

0.24
0.76
0.60
0.40

0.13
0.87
0.53
0.47

---------

0.97
0.03

0.82
0.18

0.42
0.11

0.44
0.23
0.33

-------

-------

0.01
0.27
0.19
0.33
0.02
0.04
0.14

0.00
0.09
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.07
0.44

0.00
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.04
0.28

0.48
0.52

0.52
0.48

0.49
0.51

0.06
0.20
0.75
0.00

0.00
0.02
0.95
0.03

0.07
0.19
0.62
1.00

Notes: Column (1) describes the main 2001-2007 sample. Current Population Survey (CPS) data
restricted to individuals with strictly positive working hours.
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Appendix Table 7. Effect of NOx Emissions and Ambient Ozone Concentrations On
Medication Purchases and Mortality: Instrumental Variables Estimates, 2001-2007, by
Cause
Log Medication Costs
Counties
All
with NOx
Counties
Emissions
(1)
(2a)
A: 2SLS, Respiratory or Cardiovascular
NOx Emissions
29.41
16.33*
(18.27)
(8.36)

All-Cause Mortality

Ozone
Monitored
Counties
(2b)

All
Counties
(3)

Counties
with NOx
Emissions
(4a)

Ozone
Monitored
Counties
(4b)

-----

1.94
(2.36)

1.98
(1.48)

-----

8-Hour Ozone

-----

-----

6.68*
(3.58)

-----

-----

1.18
(0.86)

Days ≥65 ppb

-----

-----

1.81*
(1.06)

-----

-----

0.39
(0.31)

3.22
(2.24)

3.37*
(1.81)

-----

B: 2SLS, Non-Respiratory and Non-Cardiovascular
NOx Emissions
19.90
11.57**
--(13.43)
(5.60)
--8-Hour Ozone

-----

-----

6.64**
(2.93)

-----

-----

1.45***
(0.53)

Days ≥65 ppb

-----

-----

1.80**
(0.86)

-----

-----

0.48**
(0.21)

Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable includes respiratory or cardiovascular medication
costs or mortality; in Panel B, the dependent variable includes all non-respiratory and noncardiovascular medication costs or mortality. The coefficient estimates in columns (1), (2a), and
(2b) are multiplied by 1000 for readability. All estimates are based on the 2001-2007 sample. NOx
emissions are measured in thousand tons per county. All regressions include county*year,
season*year, and county*season fixed effects, as well as the detailed weather controls. The
regressions are GLS weighted by the square root of the relevant population in a given county-yearseason (MarketScan or full population). The endogenous variable is NOx or ozone and the excluded
instrument is Summer*Post*NBP interaction (see equation 9). Number of observations is 30,926 for
medication regressions including all counties, 7,616 for medication regressions including counties
with NOx emissions, 2,338 for medication regressions including only counties with ozone monitors,
35,546 for mortality regressions including all counties, 7,840 for mortality regressions including
counties with NOx emissions, and 2,352 for mortality regressions only including counties with
ozone monitors. The sample is smaller for medications than for mortality due to counties without no
medication data or zero expenditures. Asterisks denote p-value < 0.10 (*), <0.05 (**), <0.01 (***).
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